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Medical malpractice “certificate of merit” statutes are pieces of state 
legislation designed to reduce frivolous malpractice lawsuits and asso-
ciated costs.1  Although the statutes vary in the requirements they place 
on litigants and in the breadth of lawsuits to which they apply, they all 
require the plaintiff in a malpractice action to consult with an expert 
either before the suit is filed or within a fixed period of time thereafter.2 
This Comment addresses whether, under the Erie doctrine, these 
statutes are applicable in federal court.  It then considers the policy 
implications of the answer.  This Comment concludes that the statutes 
are not applicable in federal court.  A faithful application of Hanna3 
and its progeny—including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
 
1 See, e.g., State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo. 2000) (stating that the purpose 
of a state’s certificate of merit statute is to ensure that the expert “has concluded that 
the plaintiff’s claim is meritorious,” thereby “‘avoiding unnecessary time and costs in 
defending professional negligence claims [and] weeding out frivolous claims’” (quot-
ing Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 984 P.2d 623, 628 (Colo. 1999)); 
Bell v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 614 S.E.2d 115, 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (ex-
plaining that statute’s goal is “to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits”). 
2 For a broad discussion of certificate of merit statutes, see generally 2 STEVEN E. 
PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 9:1 (3d ed. 2005), Karen Lerner, 
‘Junk Lawsuits’?  Tinkering with the Tort Laws, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, March 
2003, at 1, and Jefferey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading:  Any Merit to 
Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537.   
3 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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Shady Grove4—shows that the vast majority of the statutes conflict with 
one or more of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The few that are 
not clearly in conflict are not outcome determinative when that test is 
applied as Hanna instructs.  As to the policy question, this Comment 
observes that Hanna tends to require the subordination in federal 
court of certain state laws designed to regulate specific areas of policy.  
Questioning whether reform is needed to provide greater protection, 
this Comment analyzes both radical and moderate suggestions for re-
forming the Erie doctrine, incorporating where appropriate the three 
main viewpoints represented in Shady Grove.  The policy discussion 
concludes by analyzing how a moderate adjustment to Hanna might 
affect the certificate of merit issue. 
Part I contains a brief discussion of the timeliness of this issue, fol-
lowed by an overview of the statutes currently enacted, a survey of past 
decisions, and a review of other scholarly works.  In order to deter-
mine whether these statutes conflict with the Federal Rules, Section 
II.A analyzes the decisions in which the Supreme Court has indicated 
whether or not a state statute and a Federal Rule conflict.  To the ex-
tent possible, that Section extracts the legal principles animating 
those decisions and uses them as a framework to analyze whether var-
ious state statutes conflict with Rules 8, 9, 11, 12, 26, and 37.  Conclud-
ing that conflicts do exist, the discussion in Section II.A points out er-
rors in the reasoning of the courts that have concluded otherwise.  
Section II.B discusses the modified outcome determination test and 
how its application reveals a paradox built into Hanna, which favors 
the application of federal law.  Part III discusses policy implications. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Relevance to Health Care Reform 
The debate on health care reform culminating in the March 2010 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act5 gave new 
prominence to certificate of merit statutes.  As proponents and oppo-
nents of medical malpractice reform debated the virtues of various 
reform proposals,6 the certificate of merit garnered national attention 
 
4 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
5 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
6 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H12,963-67 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (debating medical 
malpractice reform proposals contained in the Republican motion to recommit the Af-
fordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
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as a type of malpractice reform that was less controversial than limit-
ing damages or attorneys’ fees. 
In July of 2009, during a markup of an early version of the health 
care reform bill, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce ap-
proved an amendment offered by Representative Bart Gordon en-
couraging states to implement certificate of merit legislation.7  The 
amendment created an incentive-payment program to reward states 
for implementing certain kinds of medical liability reform.8  Under 
the amendment as passed by the Committee, Congress would have 
been authorized to appropriate funds that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services could then distribute to states whose malpractice 
reform programs were “effective” and in compliance with the 
amendment’s guidelines.9  Those guidelines allowed incentive pay-
ments to be made if a state enacted certificate of merit laws, early offer 
laws, or both.10 
During President Obama’s ultimately fruitless attempt to win Re-
publican support for health care reform, he stated to a joint session of 
Congress in September 2009 that he would instruct the Department of 
Health and Human Services to begin immediately providing incen-
tives for states that implemented appropriate medical malpractice 
reform proposals, rather than wait for the passage of a final bill.11  
White House officials specifically indicated that eligible state legisla-
tion could include laws implementing expert-certificate require-
ments.12  They further indicated that Representative Gordon’s 
amendment was “a model for what Obama has in mind.”13 
 
7 See Markup of H.R. 3200 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (amendment offered by Reps. Bart Gordon, Nathan Deal, and Jim Matheson). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  Early offer laws allow a defendant to offer a malpractice plaintiff a settle-
ment covering economic damages and modest attorneys’ fees within a set period after 
the filing of the complaint.  If the plaintiff rejects the offer, she will later be subject to a 
heightened burden of proof at trial.  See generally Joni Hersch et al., An Empirical Assess-
ment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S231, S256 (2007) 
(finding that early offer programs can furnish a variety of benefits, such as expedited 
payments and reduced litigation costs); Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Bind-
ing Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 866 
(1999) (describing the impediments faced by plaintiffs who decline early offers). 
11 See Amy Goldstein, On Malpractice Reform, Fine Print Is Still Hazy, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 11, 2009, at A7 (reporting on President Obama’s desire for states to experiment 
with reforms that reduce the costs of medical malpractice litigation). 
12 Id.   
13 Id. 
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Although the House of Representatives subsequently passed the 
Gordon amendment as part of a larger health care reform bill,14 the 
specific bill into which the amendment was incorporated was not the 
final bill that the President ultimately signed into law.15  President Ob-
ama nonetheless delivered on his promise to create an incentive pro-
gram without waiting for specific congressional approval.  On October 
20, 2009, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a division 
of the Department of Health and Human Services, released a Request 
for Applications detailing the grant program.16  The program offered 
up to $3 million per state (up to a total of $21 million for the entire 
program) for the implementation of current or future medical liabili-
ty models that, among other things, reduce both “the incidence of fri-
volous lawsuits and liability premiums.”17  An Administration fact sheet 
confirmed that this grant program corresponded to the initiative that 
the President had mentioned to Congress.18  Recent national atten-
 
14 Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2531 (as 
passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009).  This version of the Gordon amendment required 
that, in addition to enacting either a certificate of merit requirement or early offer re-
quirement, to be eligible, the state law could not limit attorneys’ fees or damages.  Id. 
§ 2531(a)(4).  However, the efficacy of this limitation was undermined by subsection 
(a)(5), which explained that an eligible state could still limit fees or damages, as long 
as the law doing so “is not established or implemented as part of the” same law imple-
menting certificates of merit or early offers.  Id. § 2531(a)(5)(C). 
15 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 10607, 
§ 399V-4, 125 Stat. 119, 1009-14 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15).  This 
bill did authorize a broader incentive program to provide further funding to states that 
develop and implement “alternatives to current tort litigation” for resolving medical 
malpractice disputes.  Id. § 399V-4(a).  However, the program would seem to exclude 
mandatory certificate of merit statutes because of its requirement that any program 
receiving funding “provide[] patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily withdraw 
from participating in the alternative at any time.”  Id. § 399V-4(c)(2)(G).  Moreover, a 
mandatory certificate of merit statute might conflict with the statute’s requirement that 
any program receiving funding cannot “limit or curtail” a patient’s “ability to file a 
claim.”  Id. § 399V-4(c)(2)(I).  But see COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ET AL., 111TH 
CONG., HR 3962, THE AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA ACT SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS 45 (considering certificate of merit statutes to fit within the defini-
tion of the term “medical liability alternatives” for the purposes of an earlier version of 
health care reform). 
16 See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., RFA-HS-10-021, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY DEMON-
STRATION PROJECTS (2009) (instituting a grant program for states and health care sys-
tems willing to undertake reforms), available at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/ 
rfa-files/RFA-HS-10-021.html. 
17 Id. 
18 See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Patient Safety and Medical 
Liability Reform Demonstration (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://healthreform.gov/ 
newsroom/factsheet/medicalliability.html (quoting President Obama’s September 
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tion, along with an Obama Administration–provided stamp of federal 
approval, make an analysis of the applicability of certificate of merit 
statutes in federal court relevant and timely. 
B.  Survey of Statutes 
State certificate of merit statutes vary widely in their exact provi-
sions.  For instance, some are limited to medical negligence while 
others cover other types of professional negligence as well.19  For the 
purposes of this discussion, however, it is useful to categorize them  
into three rough groups. 
The first category consists of statutes that require the attorney, 
when filing the complaint, to certify that she has consulted with an 
expert and that the expert has indicated that the claim has at least a 
reasonable chance of being meritorious.  For instance, Florida’s sta-
tute asserts that 
[n]o action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out 
of medical negligence, whether in tort or in contract, unless the attorney 
filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the 
circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief 
that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.  
The complaint or initial pleading shall contain a certificate of counsel 
that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that 
grounds exist for an action against each named defendant.  For purposes 
of this section, good faith may be shown to exist if the claimant or his or 
her counsel has received a written opinion, which shall not be subject to 
discovery by an opposing party, of an expert as defined in s. 766.102 that 
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence.
20
 
Other states with statutes falling into this category include Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.21 
The second category consists of statutes that require the attorney 
to file a certificate or affidavit from the expert herself, rather than a 
certificate merely verifying that a consultation has occurred.  For ex-
 
2009 congressional address and explaining that the demonstration initiative was im-
plemented “[a]s directed by President Obama”). 
19 Compare FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (requiring certificates of merit only in 
medical negligence actions), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2008) (requiring a 
“certificate of review” in any action “based upon the alleged professional negligence of 
an acupuncturist . . . or a licensed professional”).  
20 FLA. STAT. § 766.104.  
21 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West 
2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 r. 9(j) (2007); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 19 (Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-122 (Supp. 2009). 
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ample, Ohio’s Rule of Civil Procedure 10(D) requires that the com-
plaint in any medical negligence claim include one or more “affidavits 
of merit” per defendant.22  Each affidavit must include 
(i) [a] statement that the affiant has reviewed all medical records rea-
sonably available to the plaintiff concerning the allegations contained in 
the complaint;  
(ii) [a] statement that the affiant is familiar with the applicable standard 
of care;  
(iii) [t]he opinion of the affiant that the standard of care was breached 
by one or more of the defendants to the action and that the breach 
caused injury to the plaintiff.
23
   
Other states that employ or have employed a similar approach include 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, South 
Carolina, and Washington.24 
The third category consists of statutes that require the filing of 
certificates or affidavits similar to those in the first two categories; 
however, rather than mandating that plaintiffs file certificates with the 
complaint, these statutes require the certificate to be filed within a set 
period of time after the complaint.  For instance, New Jersey’s statute 
requires that 
[i]n any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or 
property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negli-
gence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff 
shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the 
complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of 
an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability 
that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, 
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside accept-




22 OHIO R. CIV. P. 10(D). 
23 Id. 
24 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 6853 (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/2-622 (West Supp. 2009), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 
N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West 2000); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071 (LexisNexis 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100 (Supp. 
2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.150 (2007), invalidated by Putman v. Wenatchee Med. 
Ctr., 216 P.3d 374, 377-79 (Wash. 2009) (holding that statute restricted access to 
courts, violated separation of powers by intruding upon the Washington Supreme 
Court’s constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules, and conflicted with state 
procedural rules concerning pleadings and verifications). 
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010). 
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States with similar statutes include Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, Mis-
souri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas.26 
In addition to these three categories, there are a few other note-
worthy variations among certificate of merit statutes.27  A number of 
states require that the affidavit or certificate contain a significant de-
scription of the operative facts and theories employed by the con-
sulted expert in reaching her opinion.  For instance, Georgia’s statute 
requires that the affidavit “set forth specifically at least one negligent 
act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such 
claim.”28  Texas’s statute goes as far as to require that, within 120 days 
of filing a malpractice complaint, the plaintiff produce at least one de-
tailed expert report for every physician-defendant in the case.29  
Another important distinction among the various statutes lies in the 
repercussions for noncompliance or compliance in bad faith.  The 
penalties for not adhering to a certificate of merit statute include dis-
missal without prejudice,30 dismissal with prejudice,31 awarding attor-
neys’ fees to defendants,32 sanctions for the attorney,33 and even discip-
linary proceedings with the state bar association.34 
 
26 See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006), partially invalidated by Summerville v. 
Thrower, 253 S.W.3d 415, 420-21 (Ark. 2007) (holding subsection (b)(3)(a), which 
calls for dismissal of the action if the affidavit is not filed within thirty days of the com-
plaint, unconstitutional because it conflicted with Arkansas Rule 3, which governs the 
commencement of actions, and thereby intruded upon state supreme court’s constitu-
tional power to make court procedural rules); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2008); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 538.225 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (Supp. 2009); 231 PA. CODE § 1042.3 
(2008), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009).  But see W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring plaintiffs to produce “screening 
certificate[s] of merit” at least thirty days before complaint is filed). 
27 This paragraph focuses on variations that have a direct bearing on whether the 
statutes are enforceable in federal court.  There are, of course, other important varia-
tions that will not be discussed in this Comment.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
190a (West Supp. 2009) (allowing a court to extend the relevant statute of limitations if 
necessary to allow plaintiff time to comply with the “certificate of good faith” statute).  
28 GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008). 
29 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
30 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19(A)(2) (Supp. 2009) (“If the civil action 
for professional negligence is filed . . . without an affidavit being attached to the peti-
tion . . . the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the action without pre-
judice to its refiling.”). 
31 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005) (“Failure to comply with sub-
division 2, clause (1), within 60 days after demand for the affidavit results, upon mo-
tion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert 
testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.”). 
32 See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009) (estab-
lishing that if an expert report is not filed, the court should enter an order that 
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All together, this Comment has identified at least twenty-five states 
that have enacted certificate of merit statutes.35  These include states 
in ten of the eleven numbered Circuits; cumulatively, these states 
represent well over sixty percent of the United States’ population.36 
C.  Relevance in Federal Court 
Certificate of merit statutes can become relevant whenever state 
malpractice law provides the rule of decision in federal court.  Be-
cause there is no general federal malpractice cause of action, any 
medical negligence case in federal court will employ state medical 
negligence law.  Medical negligence actions arrive in federal court37 
under three different scenarios:  diversity cases,38 federal question  
cases39 in which a state malpractice claim is pendent to the federal 
claim,40 and malpractice claims against the federal government arising 
 
“awards to the affected physician or health care provider reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs of court incurred by the physician or health care provider”). 
33 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(a) (2006) (allowing “appropriate sanc-
tions” in the case of noncompliance). 
34 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (declaring that if the attorney did not file 
in good faith, “the court shall award attorney’s fees and taxable costs against claimant’s 
counsel, and shall submit the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary review of the 
attorney”). 
35 See supra notes 20-26. 
36 See United States 2009 Population Estimates by State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov (follow “Population Finder” hyperlink; then follow “Al-
phabetic” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).  
37 From January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, 1126 complaints containing a 
medical malpractice claim were filed in federal court.  See Personal Injury—Medical Mal-
practice Cases Filed Between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008, JUSTIA.COM,  
http://dockets.justia.com/search?nos=362&after=2008-01-01&before=2008-12-31 (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (listing results of an online docket search).   
38 See, e.g., Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (applying state 
malpractice law in a claim brought by an Alabama resident against a hospital in Georgia). 
39 When a district court exercises pendent jurisdiction over state claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it applies state law as if deciding a diversity case.  See Felder v. Ca-
sey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (“[W]hen a federal court exercises diversity or pendent 
jurisdiction over state-law claims, ‘the outcome of the litigation in the federal court 
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a liti-
gation, as it would be if tried in a State court.’” (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945))). 
40 Litigants attach state medical malpractice complaints to claims arising under 
several federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Patient Anti-
Dumping Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).  See, e.g., Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486, 488 
(7th Cir. 2009) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1561-62 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (Federal Patient Anti-Dumping Act). 
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).41  Cases brought under 
any of these three scenarios can result in consideration of the appli-
cability of certificate of merit statutes. 
D.  Past Decisions 
Two circuit courts have considered the Erie implications of certifi-
cate of merit statutes, both ruling that such statutes were applicable in 
federal court.  In Chamberlain v. Giampapa, the Third Circuit held that 
New Jersey’s affidavit of merit statute was applicable in federal court.42  
The Tenth Circuit, in Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp., si-
milarly held that Colorado’s certificate of review statute was applicable 
in federal court.43  Additionally, two circuits, the Eighth44 and the Ele-
venth (in a nonprecedential opinion),45 have affirmed decisions in 
which the statutes were applied, but the Erie issue was not considered.  
 
41 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680.  Although the policy considerations that ani-
mate rule-of-decision jurisprudence are different for claims brought under the FTCA, 
some federal courts apply the Erie doctrine.  See, e.g., Seery v. United States, No. 98-0671, 
2001 WL 34368387, at *1 (D. Del. May 1, 2001) (citing Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing a Third Circuit diversity analysis of New Jersey’s certif-
icate of merit statute to support the proposition that “the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit 
Statute is substantive state law that should be applied to FTCA actions”); see also Daniel v. 
United States, No. 09-2371, 2010 WL 481267, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010) (using Erie 
analysis to determine the applicable law in FTCA claims); Rahimi v. United States, 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 825, 827-29 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (same); Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728, 
734-37 (D.N.J. 1995) (same); cf., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (holding 
that district courts presiding over FTCA actions should apply the “whole law” of the fo-
rum state).  But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 553 (1951) (clarifying 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure always apply in FTCA actions).   
 Federal courts that import an Erie analysis into FTCA cases are probably ruling in-
correctly.  See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Adams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 
U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 978 n.129 (1988) (“The states are never offended by the use of 
federal procedure in cases involving the [FTCA], as they are not perceived as state-law 
matters, and the concern over forum shopping is not as relevant as it is in Erie because 
there is no comparable case that is only capable of being brought in state court.”).  
Nevertheless, to the extent that federal courts do apply Erie in FTCA contexts, those 
cases are relevant to this Comment. 
42 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000). 
43 90 F.3d 1523, 1538-41 (10th Cir. 1996). 
44 See Weasel v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr., 230 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim for failure to comply with North Dakota’s 
expert-affidavit statute without considering whether the law is applicable in federal 
court). 
45 See Johnson v. McNeil, 278 Fed. App’x 866, 871-72 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
the dismissal of a negligence action for failure to comply with Florida’s presuit require-
ments for medical malpractice claims without questioning whether the statute applies in 
federal court).  According to Eleventh Circuit rules, this opinion does not create binding 
precedent.  See 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (considering unpublished opinions nonbinding).  
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Although these affirmations suggest implicit approval by those courts, 
when the Eleventh Circuit previously considered the issue directly, it 
suggested in dicta that it might find Georgia’s statute to be applicable 
in federal court.46 
One reason for the lack of settled appellate law is that Erie issues at 
the pleading stage are generally not appealed.47  In most states, a 
plaintiff who fails to file a certificate of merit will be given a second 
chance.  Assuming the plaintiff is then able to fulfill the requirements 
of the statute, she may never have a reason to appeal the prior ruling.  
If, on the other hand, a defendant fails to convince a district court 
that the plaintiff must file a certificate, she probably cannot imme-
diately appeal the court’s ruling.48  Even if the defendant loses the 
case, the court’s ruling on the certificate of merit is unlikely to consti-
tute reversible error.49  Given the limited space available in a federal 
appellate brief, defendants focus their efforts elsewhere.50 
At the district court level, the picture becomes murkier.  While a 
majority of courts appear to have concluded that the statutes are ap-
plicable, a strong minority has ruled that they are not.51  Of the courts 
that have concluded that the statutes are applicable, some have given 
only cursory analysis.  For instance, in Finnegan v. University of Rochester 
Medical Center, the court briefly cited some nonbinding precedent and 
then summarily concluded, “I agree with these cases that a state sta-
tute requiring a certificate of merit is substantive law that applies in a 
federal diversity action.”52  Moreover, a majority or near majority of 
 
46 See Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d 770, 773-74 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that plaintiff’s 
complaint would have been sufficiently pled under either Rule 8 or Georgia’s statute). 
47 Cf. Richard Henry Seamon, An Erie Obstacle to State Tort Reform, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 
37, 86-88 (2006) (explaining that the applicability in federal court of state statutes re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages is an issue that tends to avoid appellate re-
view). 
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006) (setting forth the narrow circumstances under 
which interlocutory appeals are granted). 
49 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 233-36 (explaining why nonenforcement of a 
certificate of merit statute at the trial court level is unlikely to alter the ultimate out-
come of a case). 
50 See FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) (limiting appellant’s principal brief to either 14,000 
words or approximate equivalents in pages and lines). 
51 Compare Smith v. Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, 225 F.R.D. 233, 
242 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (applying Missouri’s health care affidavit statute), with Long v. 
Adams, 411 F. Supp. 2d 701, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to apply Michigan’s affi-
davit of merit requirement in a diversity malpractice suit).   
52 180 F.R.D. 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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federal courts in Georgia,53 Texas,54 and Florida55 have determined 
that their state statutes are not applicable in federal court.  While the 
decisional material suggests that most courts consider the statutes to 
apply in federal court, the picture is far from clear. 
It is possible that the outcomes of the decided cases are skewed by 
the quality of representation.  Caution dictates that more competent 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would file a certificate of merit if there were even 
a possibility that a judge might determine that failure to do so would 
be grounds for dismissal.  Indeed, if most plaintiffs’ attorneys volunta-
rily submit the certificates in federal court, it might predispose judges 
to assume that the statutes must apply there.  This raises questions 
about the competance of counsel who decide not to file certificates 
and who consequently are the same attorneys who will be making the 
Erie argument to courts. 
E.  Other Scholarly Work 
There is a small body of scholarly work addressing the applicabili-
ty of certificate of merit statutes in federal court.56  There is, however, 
no recent, comprehensive analysis of the problem.  Some of the ar-
ticles focus on the statute of only one state.57  Other articles are li-
mited in analytical scope, focusing chiefly on the conflict between the 
various statutes and Federal Rules 8, 9 and 11, to the exclusion of oth-
er relevant Rules, including 26 and 37.58  Lastly, at the time of writing, 
 
53 See Denton v. United States, No. 04-3285, 2006 WL 358273, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 
15, 2006) (“[C]ourts in this district have previously held that Georgia’s expert-affidavit 
requirement contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 does not apply in diversity actions filed 
in federal district courts.”). 
54 See Guzman v. Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., No. 07-3973, 2008 WL 5273713, at 
*15 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008) (listing extensive decisional law to support the proposi-
tion that federal courts in Texas do not apply Texas’s expert-report statute). 
55 See, e.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care Sys., 881 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida’s expert-affidavit statute directly conflicts with Rule 8).  
56 Interestingly, in contrast to majority of the judicial decisions on this topic sug-
gesting that certificate of merit statutes should apply in federal court, the scholarly ma-
terial overwhelmingly suggests that they should not.  
57 See, e.g., Dace A. Caldwell, Comment, Civil Procedure:  Medical Malpractice Gets Ee-
rie:  The Erie Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 
977 (2004); Robert K. Harris, Case Comment, Brown v. Nichols:  The Eleventh Circuit 
Refuses to Play the Erie Game with Georgia’s Expert Affidavit Requirement, 29 GA. L. REV. 291 
(1994); Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural Minefield—New 
Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in Its Interpretation and Applica-
tion, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 279, 290 n.61 (2002). 
58 See Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading 
Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412, 431-33 (1999) (discussing cases that considered if state sta-
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no work has been done on the applicability of certificate of merit sta-
tutes in federal court since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady 
Grove, its most recent Erie case, or even since its decisions in Twombly 59 
and Iqbal,60 cases that have fundamentally altered the meaning of 
Rule 8.61  In light of the shortcomings of prior work, the still-unsettled 
nature of the question, and the newfound prominence of the issue in 
the context of health care reform, the issue is ripe for further explora-
tion. 
II.  THE ERIE ANALYSIS 
Courts determine whether state laws should be enforced in feder-
al court by applying the Erie doctrine.  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins  
established the basic proposition that federal courts sitting in diversity 
must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.62  Guaran-
ty Trust Co. v. York instructed lower courts to distinguish between sub-
stance and procedure in the Erie context by applying an outcome-
determination test.63 
The Court enunciated the framework for its modern Erie jurispru-
dence in Hanna v. Plumer.64  Hanna established two separate prongs 
 
tutes requiring special pleading of medical malpractice claims conflict with federal 
pleading requirements); Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain 
Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis:  Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct 
About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1003-20 (2005) (explaining 
why state statutes imposing heightened pleading standards on medical malpractice 
claims conflict with the notice pleading regime established by the Federal Rules); Har-
ris, supra note 57, at 301-07 (concluding that Georgia’s expert-affidavit requirement 
conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 11, and 15). 
59 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
60 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
61 Cf. Penrose & Caldwell, supra note 58, at 999 (arguing that certificate of merit 
statutes conflict with the Federal Rules because “[i]n 1957, 1993, and 2002, the Su-
preme Court evaluated the issue of heightened pleadings and, in each instance, re-
buffed attempts to incorporate any heightened pleading requirement into Rule 8”). 
62 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (“The 
broad command of Erie was . . . [that] federal courts are to apply state substantive law 
and federal procedural law.”). 
63 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“In essence, the intent of 
[Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction 
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation 
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine 
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”).   
64 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-74.  For a discussion of the development of the Erie 
doctrine through Hanna, see John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 693 (1974), and Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to be Applied in Diversity 
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for analyzing Erie questions:  a first prong for areas where a valid Fed-
eral Rule or federal statute is directly on point and a second prong 
where no Rule or statute covers the issue in dispute and only federal 
common law stands in opposition to the application of the state law in 
question.65  In the case of a controlling Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure, promulgated by the Supreme Court with Congress’s acquies-
cence, the Court ruled that only the Constitution and the Rules 
Enabling Act establish limitations on the Rule’s enforceability.66  As 
long as the Rule does not exceed the power granted to the courts by 
either the Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act, federal courts will 
enforce it over a conflicting state law, even if this might yield a differ-
ent outcome in litigation.67 
When there is no controlling Federal Rule or statute on point, 
Hanna’s second prong instructs courts to answer the sub-
stance/procedure question by applying an outcome-determination 
test.68  However, Hanna tempered York’s outcome-determination test.  
 
Cases:  A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Problems, 
163 F.R.D. 19 (1995). 
65 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-71 (distinguishing between situations in which state 
law applies because no Federal Rule covers the point in dispute and those in which a 
Federal Rule controls the issue, displacing conflicting state laws). 
66 See id. at 463-64 (concluding that, because Rule 4(d)(1) is valid pursuant to 
both the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act, it controls). 
67 See id. at 472-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to 
function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to dis-
embowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ 
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”).  A Rule is valid under the Rules 
Enabling Act as long as it does not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and its progeny, the Court ex-
plained that this limitation permits any rule that “really regulates procedure,—the 
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law.”  312 
U.S. 1, 14 (1941); accord Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) 
(“We have long held that this limitation means that the Rule must ‘really regulat[e] 
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substan-
tive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of 
them . . . .’” (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14)).  For further discussion of the validity of 
the Sibbach test following Shady Grove, see infra note 256.  
68 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-67, 470-74 (asserting that the outcome-determination 
test applies in those cases where “no Federal Rule . . . cover[s] the point in dispute”).  
Interestingly, the Court characterizes both the test to determine validity under the 
Rules Enabling Act and the outcome-determination test as tests that distinguish be-
tween substance and procedure, even though those two tests can yield different results.  
See id. at 470-71 (“It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, 
that federal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ 
law . . . .”).  For a discussion of the shifting line between substance and procedure in 
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First, Hanna warned courts not to apply the test syllogistically.  The 
Court explained that any state procedural law not followed by a liti-
gant in federal court can seem outcome determinative if its applica-
tion in federal court means the litigant loses, whereas refusal to apply 
it means the litigation continues.69  Instead, the Hanna Court ex-
plained, lower courts should apply the outcome-determination test 
with “reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule:  discouragement of 
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws.”70  Although later cases have refined the meaning of the Su-
preme Court’s Erie jurisprudence, Hanna still provides the basic 
framework by which federal courts must analyze the applicability of 
certificate of merit statutes. 
A.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  Hanna’s First Prong 
1.  Determining Whether There Is a Controlling  
Federal Enactment on Point 
Analyzing a potential conflict under the first prong of Hanna re-
quires a determination of whether the state law conflicts with any of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.71  Because the Supreme Court 
has never found that a Federal Rule violates the Constitution or goes 
beyond the limits set by the Rules Enabling Act,72 the crucial analysis 
in Hanna’s first prong is determining whether the Federal Rule in 
question is broad enough to control the situation.73 
 
the context of Hanna, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1027-35 (1982), and Ely, supra note 64, at 718-38.  
69 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69; see also A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE:  A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 356 (2007) (criticizing York’s outcome-determination test 
by suggesting that “all legal rules have the potential to impact the outcome of a case”). 
70 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
71 For discussions of the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see gener-
ally 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 124.03 (3d ed. 2007); 
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4510 (2d ed. 
1996); Ides, supra note 64, at 61-67. 
72 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1030, at 166-67 (3d ed. 2002).  See also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., 
Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“[W]e have rejected every statutory challenge to a 
Federal Rule that has come before us.”). 
73 It is important to note that in recent years, most notably in Semtek, the Court has 
resorted to strained, narrow interpretations of the Federal Rules in order to avoid 
Enabling Act challenges.  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
505-06 (2001) (holding that although Rule 41(b) deems an involuntary dismissal un-
der its terms to be an “adjudication on the merits,” that term confers no preclusive ef-
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In Hanna, the Supreme Court contrasted the supposed simplicity of 
this step with the “relatively unguided Erie choice.”74  However, defining 
when a Federal Rule is coextensive with state law to the point that the 
Federal Rule controls is, in reality, a difficult and abstract question.  Al-
though the Supreme Court has provided some guidance, it is the ambi-
guity of this question that leads to discord among courts and scholars as 
to whether certificate of merit statutes are applicable in federal court.  
To construct a general framework for determining when a Federal Rule 
and state law conflict, it makes sense to study the line of Supreme Court 
cases analyzing this question in an attempt to form the most cohesive 
set of principles possible. 
Prior to Hanna, the Supreme Court had never explicitly declared 
that a valid Federal Rule always trumps state law with which it is suffi-
ciently coextensive.75  In Hanna, the plaintiff served the executor of 
the defendant’s estate by leaving copies of the summons and com-
plaint with the executor’s wife at his residence.76  This service was suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(d)(1), which allows ser-
vice to be made by leaving copies at the defendant’s “dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discre-
tion then residing therein.”77  The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff had failed to ad-
here to a Massachusetts statute requiring in-hand service for the 
executor of an estate.78  The Supreme Court concluded that as to 
these two enactments, “the clash is unavoidable; Rule 4(d)(1) says—
implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity—that in-hand service is not 
required in federal courts.”79 
 
fect if a claim is brought in other districts); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum 
Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1042-46 (2002) (ex-
plaining that the drafters of Rule 41(b) intended for the Rule to have preclusive effect 
in other districts); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:  Interpreting the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1150-52 (2002) (observing that in its 
efforts to avoid Enabling Act challenges, the Court has shown a willingness to depart 
“from a Rule’s text and Notes”); cf. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448-60 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (urging the Court to employ stricter scrutiny when evaluating the validity 
of a Federal Rule under the Rules Enabling Act).   
74 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
75 See Ides, supra note 64, at 34-55 (tracking doctrinal developments from Erie to 
Hanna). 
76 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 462. 
79 Id. at 470. 
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Hanna suggested that if the Federal Rules explicitly say that a giv-
en means (residential service) of accomplishing an end (notice) is suf-
ficient, then it shall be sufficient even if a state statute requires more 
rigorous means (in-hand service). 
The next important case in this chain is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.80  
In Walker, the Court held that Rule 3, which deems an action com-
menced when the plaintiff files her complaint with the court, did not 
exclude the operation of an Oklahoma statute mandating that, for the 
purpose of tolling a statute of limitations, an action is commenced 
upon service of the summons to the defendant.81  The Court observed 
that the “Hanna analysis” only occurs if there is a “‘direct collision’ be-
tween the Federal Rule and the state law.”82  The Court framed the 
question by asking whether “the Federal Rule . . . is sufficiently broad 
to control the issue before the Court.”83  However, the Court imme-
diately softened that rule with a footnote instructing that “this is not to 
suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly 
construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law.  The 
Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.”84 
In justifying its holding, the Court observed that there is nothing 
to suggest that Rule 3 was intended to govern tolling of statutes or to 
displace state laws governing that topic.85  The Court concluded that 
 
80 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
81 See id. at 750-52 (describing the Federal Rule and state statute at issue to con-
clude that the latter applies in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction).  The 
facts of this case were virtually indistinguishable from those of Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).  The Court used Walker as an opportunity 
to show that the pre-Hanna cases construing the Erie doctrine did indeed survive the 
decision in Hanna.  Walker, 446 U.S. at 749. 
82 Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472).  Walker credits Hanna 
for the “direct collision” language.  However, in Hanna, the Court uses “direct colli-
sion” to describe the type of cases that had not previously been decided in the Court’s 
Erie jurisprudence.  In Walker, “direct collision” explicitly becomes an affirmative re-
quirement.  Compare Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (“[T]his Court has never before been con-
fronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law 
of the relevant State . . . .”), with Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (“Application of the Hanna 
analysis is premised on a ‘direct collision’ between the Federal Rule and the state law.”).   
83 Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50. 
84 Id. at 750 n.9. 
85 Id. at 750-51 (“There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state 
statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules for pur-
poses of state statutes of limitations.” (footnote ommitted)).  The Court supported its 
findings on the intent of Rule 3 by citing two sources:  a section from Wright and Mil-
ler’s treatise, observing that Rule 3 does not explicitly state that it has a tolling effect, 
and an Advisory Committee Note, stating that the answer to the question of whether 
Rule 3 tolls a statute might turn on whether or not the Supreme Court can promulgate 
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because Rule 3 and the Oklahoma statute serve different purposes and 
are animated by different policies, they can “exist side by side . . . each 
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.”86 
At first glance, Hanna and Walker seem compatible.  In Hanna, the 
Federal Rules explicitly set forth the sufficiency requirements for ser-
vice of process, whereas, in Walker, the unsuccessful petitioner at-
tempted to take a Rule that governed when the internal clock of the 
Federal Rules began running and apply it to toll a state statute of limi-
tations.  However, a tension appears between the two decisions in light 
of scholarship observing that the Supreme Court in Hanna ignored 
the First Circuit’s observation below that Massachusetts had its own 
rule identical to Rule 4(d)(1) to govern service of process.87  The in-
hand requirement added by the Massachusetts statute was to ensure 
that in the case of an executor, service was “‘sufficient to satisfy due 
process requirements for in personam jurisdiction.’”88  In this light, 
the cases seem to conflict.  In both cases, the Federal Rule and the 
state law seem to set the procedural requirements for accomplishing 
the same thing (“service of process” in Hanna and “commencement of 
the action” in Walker) but for different reasons. 
Although a skeptic (and perhaps a realist) would explain the dif-
ference by pointing to the Court’s desire to use Hanna as an opportu-
nity to protect the uniformity of the Federal Rules,89 federal courts 
must make a good-faith attempt to distinguish the two cases.  That dis-
tinction is best stated as follows:  while the Federal Rule and the state 
law in Hanna may have been designed to accomplish different ulti-
mate ends, within the context of the litigation they were both rules 
governing the same procedural activity (service of process).  On the 
other hand, in Walker, the state law and Federal Rule only appeared to 
govern the same thing (commencement of the action), when in actu-
ality, they governed different procedural activities (the “various timing 
 
rules that affect the functioning of statutes of limitations without simultaneously ex-
ceeding the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act.  Id. at 750 n.10.  The Court ex-
plained the relevance of the latter by observing that the Advisory Committee predicted 
the problem without explicitly resolving it.  Id. 
86 Id. at 752. 
 87 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 68, at 1173-76 (“The court of appeals’ gloss con-
firms what a fair reading of the statute as a whole suggests, namely that the [state] sta-
tutory provisions in question were the functional equivalent of a tolling rule.”). 
88 Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964), rev’d, 380 U.S. 
460 (1965)). 
89 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463 (“Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of 
federal procedure posed by the decision below, we granted certiorari.”); see also Burbank, 
supra note 68, at 1176 (characterizing Hanna as “invoking a threat that did not exist”). 
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requirements of the Federal Rules”90 versus the tolling of a state sta-
tute of limitations).  This rather abstract distinction is more easily un-
derstood by examining what happens if a federal court gives effect to 
the state laws in question.  Enforcement of the Massachusetts statute 
in federal court would rob Rule 4 of the ability to set the sufficiency 
requirements for service of process in federal court.  On the other 
hand, enforcement in federal court of Oklahoma’s law requiring ser-
vice of process in order to toll a statute of limitations does not under-
mine Rule 3’s ability to initiate the “various timing requirements of 
the Federal Rules.”  Thus the logical principles to extract from Walker 
are the following:  the Rules should be given their plain meaning, and 
when a Federal Rule and a state statute appear to function similarly—
but govern entirely different procedural activities—a federal court 
should allow them both to operate. 
Seven years after Walker, the Court took a step toward a broader 
reading of the Federal Rules in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. 
Woods.91  In Burlington Northern, the Eleventh Circuit, in accordance 
with the mandates of an Alabama statute, had imposed a ten-percent 
penalty on an appellant-defendant who had obtained a stay on judg-
ment and subsequently lost his appeal.92  The Court ruled that the Al-
abama statute was inapplicable in federal court because it conflicted 
with Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which gives 
judges the discretion to punish appellants who take frivolous appeals.93 
The Court’s reasoning is instructive for the task at hand.  While 
confirming that a “direct collision” between a Federal Rule and a state 
statute was a sure sign that the Federal Rule, if valid, must prevail, the 
Court also suggested that the Federal Rule prevails if it is “sufficiently 
broad” that it “implicitly . . . ‘control[s] the issue’ before the court.”94  
The Court cited with approval and then applied two propositions 
from an analogous Fifth Circuit case:  first, the mandatory operation 
of the state penalty statute interferes with “the discretionary mode of 
operation of the Federal Rule”; and second, the Federal Rule punish-
es only frivolously taken appeals, whereas the state statute penalizes all 
 
90 Walker, 446 U.S. at 751. 
91 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
92 Id. at 2-3. 
93 See id. at 7 (holding that because “the Rule’s discretionary mode of operation 
unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty 
statute,” the latter is precluded from application in federal diversity actions); see also 
FED. R. APP. P. 38 (permitting a court of appeals to “award just damages and single or 
double costs to the appellee” if it “determines that an appeal is frivolous”). 
94 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749). 
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unsuccessful appellants.95  That both the Rule and statute serve the 
same purpose (“compensate[ing] a victorious appellee for the lost use 
of the judgment proceeds”) constituted a further indication that “the 
Rule occupies the [Alabama] statute’s field of operation so as to prec-
lude its application in federal diversity actions.”96  It makes no differ-
ence, the Court added, that Alabama’s Rule 28, modeled after the 
Federal Rules, is capable of operating side by side with its mandatory 
penalty statute.97 
From Burlington Northern we can extract the principle that when 
the Federal Rules leave a question to the discretion of the trial court, 
state laws that interfere with that discretion will not be enforced.  
Moreover, the decision suggests that when it comes to punishing mis-
behaving litigants, interfering with the Court’s ability not to punish is 
grounds to refuse application of a state law in federal court. 
The Supreme Court reinforced Burlington Northern’s holding in Ste-
wart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.98  Although Ricoh involved a federal 
statute rather than a Court-promulgated rule, the “direct collision” step 
of the analysis is the same.99  In Ricoh, the district court denied defen-
dant’s 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue even though the 
parties’ contract had a forum-selection clause requiring suits to proceed 
in the target venue.100  The trial judge justified his ruling by explaining 
that Alabama law looked unfavorably upon forum-selection clauses.101 
Notably, the Supreme Court dropped the “direct collision” lan-
guage and clarified that the federal enactment governs if it is “‘suffi-
ciently broad to control the issue before the Court.’”102  The Court, cit-
ing Burlington Northern, ruled that the Alabama law disallowing forum-
 
95 See id. at 6-7 (invoking the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Affholder, Inc. v. Southern 
Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
96 Id. at 7 & n.5. 
97 Id. at 7-8. 
98 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
99 See Ides, supra note 64, at 80 (describing the analysis for a Federal Rule and a 
federal statute as “identical”). 
100 Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 24-25. 
101 Id. at 24. 
102 Id. at 26 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50).  As the Court explained,  
[l]ogic indicates . . . that this language is not meant to mandate that federal 
law and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at 
hand; rather, the “direct collision” language, at least where the applicability of 
a federal statute is at issue, expresses the requirement that the federal statute 
be sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute. 
Id. at 26 n.4 (construing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)). 
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selection clauses could not be enforced in federal court, as it de-
stroyed the discretion Congress gave judges in its enactment of the 
venue transfer statute.103  The Court clarified that it did not matter if 
the policy concerns animating the Alabama law “are not perfectly 
coextensive” with the policies that determine the factors the district 
court considers when ruling on a motion to transfer venue.104 
Ricoh strengthened Burlington Northern’s holding.  If the federal 
enactment’s “‘discretionary mode of operation’ conflicts with the 
nondiscretionary provision[s]” of state law, the federal enactment ap-
plies in diversity even if wholly different policy concerns animate the 
state law.105  Although the discretionary/mandatory core of the hold-
ings in Ricoh and Burlington Northern remains undisturbed, after Ricoh 
the Court’s Hanna jurisprudence began to focus on the question of 
what role, if any, state policies had in determining whether a Federal 
Rule and state law conflicted. 
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, a question arose concerning 
the scope of Rule 59 in a case determining whether federal judges are 
bound by New York’s “deviates materially” standard for granting new 
trials in response to excessive jury verdicts.106  Rule 59 allows a trial 
judge to grant a new jury trial “for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”107  Citing 
Burlington Northern, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that Rule 59 was 
sufficiently broad to control the issue of when district courts can grant 
new trials, thereby requiring that federal law control the issue.108  He 
further argued that the phrase “in the courts of the United States” 
shows that a federal standard must apply.109 
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion argued that 
whether damages are excessive (a traditional reason for granting a 
new trial) must be determined by some standard; a standard that the 
Rules of Decision Act requires to be a state standard in state causes of 
 
103 See id. at 31 (“Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern trans-
fer within the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single concern or a 
subset of the factors identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that command.”). 
104 Id. at 30.  But see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 
(1996) (observing, in dicta, that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted the Federal 
Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies”). 
105 Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 30 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 
(1987)). 
106 518 U.S. 415, 420-22 (1996). 
107 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). 
108 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
109 Id. at 467-68. 
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action.110  Perhaps more important than the Court’s holding on 
whether Rule 59 conflicted with the New York standard was the 
Court’s characterization of the method for determining when a Fed-
eral Rule conflicts with state law.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for a 5-4 
majority, twice invoked avoidance of conflict with important state reg-
ulatory interests and policies as a major guidepost for federal courts 
construing the breadth of the Federal Rules.111  Although there was lit-
tle precedent establishing this as a major concern of the Hanna analy-
sis in the Supreme Court’s cases prior to Gasperini,112 Justice Ginsburg’s 
 
110 See id. at 437 n.22 (majority opinion) (“Whether damages are excessive for the 
claim-in-suit must be governed by some law.  And there is no candidate for that gover-
nance other than the law that gives rise to the claim in relief—here, the law of New 
York.” (citing Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (1994))); see also id. at 
440 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Rule does state that new trials may be granted 
‘for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at 
law in the courts of the United States,’ but that hardly constitutes a command that fed-
eral courts must always substitute federal limits on the size of judgments for those set 
by the several States in cases founded upon state-law causes of action.” (quoting  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 59)).  
111 Id. at 427 n.7, 437 n.22 (majority opinion). 
112 To support the majority’s assertion that a concern for state regulatory policies 
played a major role in pre-Gasperini cases interpreting the Federal Rules, the Court 
cited Walker, a case from the Seventh Circuit, and a federal courts casebook.  Id. at 427 
n.7 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-752 (1980), S.A. Healy Co. 
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310-312 (7th Cir. 1995), and RICHARD 
H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 729-730 (4th ed. 1996)).  Although Walker did examine the policies underpinning 
the Oklahoma law in support of its determination that the state law was not coexten-
sive with the Federal Rule, at no point did the Walker Court anoint protection of state 
regulatory policies as a normative value in its own right for the purposes of the conflict-
analysis step of Hanna.  Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52.   
 The Court’s citation of Healy also raises eyebrows.  In Healy, Judge Posner observed 
that there were two “pretty clear” classes of cases for the purposes of the Erie doctrine.  
Healy, 60 F.3d at 310.  First, the court rightly observed that if a state law conflicts with a 
Federal Rule, it is easy to rule that the Federal Rule controls (assuming the Rule’s va-
lidity under the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act).  Id.  The second “pretty 
clear” type of case occurs when “the state procedural rule, though undeniably ‘proce-
dural’ in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such 
as contract law.”  Id.  In this instance, the court opined, the state’s substantive intent is 
“manifest” and the law must be enforced.  Id.  This second observation is much more 
troublesome.  First, there is nothing that guarantees that laws included in the second 
class of “pretty clear” cases do not also conflict with the Federal Rules.  In fact, that is 
precisely the problem that certificate of merit statutes present.  Second, even for state 
laws that only fall in the second category of “pretty clear” cases, deciding their fate in 
federal court by concluding that they are obviously evidence of the state’s manifest 
substantive intent flouts Hanna’s instructions to analyze such laws by querying whether 
they are outcome determinative with respect to the twin aims of Erie.  Instead, it har-
kens back to a pre–Guaranty Trust method of resolving Erie questions by an intuitive 
analysis of whether the law is substantive or procedural.   
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opinion unequivocally listed it as a relevant factor.  Therefore, Gaspe-
rini’s holding added to the doctrine that although a Federal Rule might 
be sufficiently broad to control a situation, that Rule’s application may 
implicitly involve the use of state laws.  Its dicta added that it is impor-
tant for federal courts to interpret Federal Rules “with sensitivity to im-
portant state interests and regulatory policies.”113 
The Court handed down its most recent gloss on Hanna in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.114  In Shady Grove, the 
petitioner brought a diversity claim against Allstate for roughly five- 
hundred dollars in statutory interest that had accrued while Allstate 
delayed payment of a claim.115  Admitting that the claim fell far short 
of the amount-in-controversy requirement for individual diversity 
claims,116 the petitioner attempted to certify its claim as a class ac-
tion,117 despite the fact that New York law forbids class certification in 
actions involving this type of statutory penalty.118  Both the trial court 
and the Second Circuit rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 
New York law conflicted with Rule 23, concluding that the state law 
and the Federal Rule served different purposes.119 
 
 Flaws in the reasoning of Healy aside, its use in Gasperini is also questionable.  Al-
though the parenthetical following the citation accurately summarizes the holding of 
Healy, the case is cited to support the Court’s assertion that the federal courts interpret 
the Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”  Gasperi-
ni, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7.  However, the portion of Healy that pays attention to state inter-
ests and regulatory policies is its description of the “second class of pretty easy cases.”  
Healy, 60 F.3d at 310.  When it came to interpreting a Federal Rule, as the Court’s pa-
renthetical acknowledges, Healy merely held that Rule 68, which on its face only ap-
plies to offers by defendants, did not also apply to offers by plaintiffs.  Id.  Such a hold-
ing does not require particular sensitivity to state regulatory interests. 
113 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7. 
114 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
115 Id. at 1436-37. 
116 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (requiring the amount in controversy to exceed 
$75,000 for individual diversity claims in federal court). 
117 See  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (granting to federal 
district courts original jurisdiction over class actions in which there is minimum diversity 
and the aggregate amount in controversy of all class claims exceeds $5 million). 
118 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006) 
(“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery 
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a pe-
nalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be 
maintained as a class action.”). 
119 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also FED R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth require-
ments for bringing a class action in federal court).  
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With a 5-4 majority representing Chief Justice Roberts, Justice So-
tomayor, and the still-sitting dissenters from Gasperini,120 the Court re-
versed, concluding that Rule 23’s language—“a class action may be 
maintained” if certain conditions are met—“[b]y its terms . . . creates 
a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified 
criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”121  Justice Scalia’s majori-
ty opinion explained with unmistakable clarity that, because the Court 
viewed Rule 23 as setting forth sufficient, rather than necessary, crite-
ria for bringing class actions, state laws imposing further duties con-
flicted with Rule 23 and would not be enforced in federal court.122  It 
made no apparent difference that the state law may have had a differ-
ent purpose or that it was able to coexist at the state level with another 
state law structured similarly to the Federal Rule in question.123 
The Court also attempted to shed some light on what role state 
regulatory policies (and federal sensitivity thereto) should play when a 
federal court construes the Federal Rules.  However, it is difficult to 
discern which Justices’ views on the subject will ultimately carry the 
most precedential weight.  This difficulty is largely the result of poten-
tial inconsistencies between portions of the majority opinion joined by 
Justice Stevens and comments made in Justice Stevens’s concurrence.  
The majority opinion, in sections joined by Justice Stevens, took 
strong steps to contradict the language in Gasperini regarding state in-
terests and regulatory policies.  The majority wrote that “[t]he dis-
sent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules con-
flict based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an 
enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’”124  
Specifically in response to the dissent’s invocation of Gasperini’s lan-
guage regarding “important state interests” and “state regulatory poli-
cies,” the Court commented that “[t]he search for state interests and 
 
120 Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996) (attribut-
ing dissenting votes to then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Stevens, Scalia, 
and Thomas), with Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436, 1448 (attributing majority votes to 
Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Sotomayor). 
121 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
122 See id. at 1439 (“Rule 23 permits all class actions that meet its requirements, 
and a State cannot limit that permission . . . .”).  The Court went as far as to announce 
its first clear-cut rule for determining when Federal Rules and state laws conflict.  Jus-
tice Scalia’s majority opinion observed that “[t]he Federal Rules regularly use ‘may’ to 
confer categorical permission,” implying that any state law that adds requirements to 
what the Federal Rules say a litigant otherwise “may” do necessarily conflicts with the 
Federal Rules.  Id. at 1437. 
123 Id. at 1438-39. 
124 Id. at 1440-41 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
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policies that are ‘important’ is just as standardless as the ‘important or 
substantial’ criterion we rejected in Sibbach.”125  The majority conceded 
that federalism concerns might play a role in the interpretation of an 
ambiguous Federal Rule, but only to the extent that in discerning the 
Rule’s meaning, courts can assume that “‘Congress is just as con-
cerned as we have been to avoid significant differences between state 
and federal courts.’”126  In other words, courts might consider federal-
ism concerns when attempting to discern the Rule’s meaning in gen-
eral, but they will not consider the policies that the specific, potential-
ly conflicting state law raises in the adjudication at hand.   
 Were it not for the concurrence, this would be a clear indication 
that a majority of the Court rejected Justice Ginsburg’s belief—as ex-
pressed in Gasperini and in the Shady Grove dissent—that important 
state policies should play a role at the conflict-analysis stage of Hanna.  
But Justice Stevens’s concurrence appeared to rehabilitate the Gaspe-
rini language to a limited extent.  He commented that, in applying the 
first step of Hanna, courts should construe the Federal Rules with 
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”127  
However, while admitting that he agreed with Justice Ginsburg that 
courts should consider state interests and regulatory policies, Justice 
Stevens stated that he “disagree[d] . . . about the degree to which the 
meaning of federal rules may be contorted . . . to accommodate state 
policy goals.”128  Specifically, his citation to Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion in Ricoh suggests that Stevens actually agreed with the majori-
ty that courts can consider federalism concerns in the abstract when 
determining the general scope of a Federal Rule, but that courts should 
 
125 Id. at 1441 n.7 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13-14).  The Court also took issue 
with Gasperini’s characterization of Walker as having been guided by the Court’s im-
pression of state policies, noting that  
[w]hile our opinion [in Walker] observed that the State’s actual-service rule 
was (in the State’s judgment) an “integral part of the several policies served by 
the statute of limitations,” nothing in our decision suggested that a federal 
court may resolve an obvious conflict between the texts of state and federal 
rules by resorting to the state law’s ostensible objectives.   
Id. at 1440 n.6 (citation omitted) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 466 U.S. 740, 
751 (1980)). 
126 Id. at 1441 n.7 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 
(1988)).   
127 Id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)). 
128 Id. at 1451. 
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not worry about effectuating the substantive state policies motivating 
individual state laws when they are at the conflict-analysis stage.129 
Thus, Hanna and its progeny leave the following concepts for con-
struing when a Federal Rule is sufficiently broad to control an issue:  
(1) if the Federal Rules say that meeting enunciated standards is suffi-
cient to accomplish a procedural objective, those standards suffice 
even if state law calls for something greater—this is especially true if 
the Rules state a litigant “may” do something; (2) the Federal Rules 
should not be narrowly construed in order to avoid a “direct collision” 
with state law—they should be given their plain meaning; (3) when a 
Federal Rule and state statute appear to do the same thing, but govern 
entirely different procedural activities, the federal court should allow 
both to operate side by side; (4) when the Federal Rules leave an issue 
to the court’s discretion, a mandatory state rule interfering with that 
discretion will not be enforced in federal court; (5) the previous rule 
is true even if the state rule is animated by different policy concerns 
than the Federal Rule—to the extent that federalism concerns influ-
ence the construction of the Rules, they affect the general scope of 
the Rule, but the Rule does not need to be narrowly constructed to 
avoid conflict with individual state policies; and (6) effectuating a 
Federal Rule may implicitly involve the use of legal standards supplied 
by state law.  It is under these principles that this Comment argues 
certificate of merit statutes conflict with the Federal Rules. 
2.  Rules 8, 9, and 12 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and 12 provide a logical 
starting point.  These three rules work together to govern pleading in 
federal court, so it makes sense to discuss them as a unit.130  Rule 8 re-
 
129 See id. at 1456-57 (“The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry 
under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the Act, by 
its own terms, does not apply. . . . Although it reflects a laudable concern to protect 
‘state regulatory policies,’ Justice Ginsburg’s approach would, in my view, work an end 
run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules, and our decision in Hanna.  
Federal courts can and should interpret federal rules with sensitivity to ‘state preroga-
tives,’ but even when ‘state interests . . . warrant our respectful consideration,’ federal 
courts cannot rewrite the rules.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Id. at 1462, 1464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting))).  
130 Rule 8 covers pleading generally, Rule 9 covers instances in which the Federal 
Rules require a heightened pleading standard, and Rule 12 covers the consequences 
for insufficient pleadings.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 9; FED. R. CIV. P. 12; see also 5 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1203 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the relationship between Rule 8 and the other Rules 
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quires a plaintiff’s complaint to contain “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”131  The Su-
preme Court has recently ruled that this Rule requires complaints to 
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”132  If a complaint does not meet 
these requirements, the trial court may dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) 
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”133 
a.  Statutes Requiring Plaintiffs to File Certificates of Merit and Complaints 
Simultaneously 
Certificate of merit statutes that require plaintiffs to file the certif-
icate contemporaneously with the complaint are incompatible with 
the pleading scheme established by the Federal Rules.  By requiring 
plaintiffs to include or attach certain items to their complaints, or else 
face dismissal for failure to state a claim, these statutes have effectively 
mandated a heightened pleading requirement.  The analogy to Han-
na and Shady Grove is striking.  In Hanna, the Court found that Rule 4, 
which establishes the requirements for sufficient service, operated to 
the exclusion of state statutes requiring more demanding service.134  
Similarly, in Shady Grove, the Court found that Rule 23 establishes the 
requirements for bringing a class action and determined that federal 
courts should not enforce additional state law requirements.135  Apply-
ing this logic, lower courts should rule that, because the Federal Rules 
set the sufficiency requirement for complaints in federal court, state 
laws requiring more should not be enforced. 
 
of Civil Procedure).  This discussion focuses principally on the affirmative require-
ments of Rule 8, which implicitly operates with Rules 9 and 12. 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
132 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  The Court elaborated, “A claim has facial plausi-
bility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
133 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (discussing the stan-
dard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)).  
134 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (asserting that a state in-hand 
service requirement directly collides with Rule 4(d)(1), which “says . . . that in-hand 
service is not required in federal courts”). 
135 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, at 1437-
38 (2010) (explaining that Rule 23 permits all plaintiffs satisfying its criteria to initiate 
a class action regardless of contrary state law).  The Court specifically suggested that 
pleading standards were difficult cases but should generally be considered procedural.  
Id. at 1441. 
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Rule 8’s history and motivation support this argument.  The draf-
ters of the Federal Rules created Rule 8 to depart from the highly 
technical code pleading that preceded it.136  They designed Rule 8 to 
provide the federal courts with a simplified form of transsubstantive 
pleading, without formal requirements for different claims.137  It is anti-
thetical to the purpose of Rule 8 to enforce state statutes under which 
failing to specify certain things or include certain items in a complaint 
might result in dismissal. 
Several federal courts have applied similar logic.  In an oft-cited 
decision, Judge Alaimo in the Southern District of Georgia held that 
by “requiring that the plaintiff attach to his complaint the affidavit of 
an expert witness, [Georgia’s] statute in effect mandates the pleading 
of evidentiary material.”138  The court concluded that “[t]he teaching 
of Hanna is that, in situations of such conflict, the Federal Rule is con-
trolling.  Therefore, the sufficiency of plaintiff’s pleading must be 
judged solely by reference to Federal Rule 8.”139 
Other courts have disagreed, but their reasoning seems question-
able.  The decision in Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Kishwaukee Valley 
Medical Group140 is typical in this regard.  A then-valid Illinois statute 
required that a plaintiff attach to her complaint both an affidavit say-
ing that an expert has found the claim to be reasonable and merito-
rious, as well as a signed report from that expert.141  Thompson, a fre-
quently cited opinion, held in two sentences that Rule 8 did not conflict 
with the state statute, concluding that requiring the attachment of the 
affidavit to the complaint does not enlarge pleading standards because 
a plaintiff could attach the affidavit “and still plead the factual basis of 
his claim in a short plain statement in the complaint itself.”142 
This is an illusory argument.  If the sufficiency of the pleading is 
judged in part by adherence to the affidavit requirement, then the af-
fidavit requirement is part of the pleading requirement.  The mere 
fact that the affidavit is a physically separate document should not 
 
136 See generally Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1941) (discussing 
the benefits of simplified pleadings in comparison to the technical requirements of the 
earlier code-pleading regime). 
137 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1221 (discussing the transsubstantive 
nature of Rule 8).   
138 Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990). 
139 Id. 
140 No. 86-1483, 1986 WL 11381 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1986). 
141 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West Supp. 2009), invalidated by Lebron 
v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010). 
142 Thompson, 1986 WL 11381, at *2. 
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matter.  Following the court’s logic would mean that any time a state 
wanted to require a party to submit more than what is required by the 
Federal Rules, it would merely need to label the extra part a “certifi-
cate” or “affidavit” and require it to be filed with the court on a sepa-
rate sheet of paper.143 
Some statutes that appear even more troublesome have gone un-
questioned.  Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which are modeled after the Federal Rules, requires that a “pleading 
specifically assert[] that the medical care has been reviewed by a per-
son who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under 
Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify.”144  De-
spite the fact that this statute openly modifies pleadings themselves 
and is featured in North Carolina’s Rule 9, which governs heightened 
pleading standards,145 not one published opinion from a federal court 
has considered the choice of law implications of the North Carolina 
Rule.146  A proper application of the principles of Hanna and its prog-
eny mandates that Federal Rules 8 and 9 be construed as sufficiently 
broad to cover the pleading standard in federal court.  Therefore, cer-
tificate of merit statutes requiring plaintiffs to file certificates or affida-
vits contemporaneously with their complaints should not be enforced. 
b.  Statutes Requiring Plaintiffs to File Certificates of Merit by a Specified Point 
in Time After the Filing of Complaints 
The question is more difficult when dealing with statutes in the 
third category—statutes that do not require an affidavit or certificate 
to be filed with the pleading, but rather at some point thereafter.  The 
 
143 By arguing that Rule 8 is unchanged because a plaintiff attaching an affidavit 
can otherwise adhere to Rule 8, the court has effectively argued that the pleading re-
quirement is not heightened, because as long as one does not consider the require-
ments the statute adds, the statute does not add any requirements at all. 
144 N.C. GEN STAT. § 1A-1 r. 9( j)(1) (2007). 
145 See, e.g., Brisson v. Santoriello, 516 S.E.2d 911, 913-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (ob-
serving that North Carolina’s Rule 9( j) defines a “pleading requirement,” failure to 
comply with which results in a dismissal under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6)).   
146 At the time of writing, a Westlaw search of the thirty-nine federal cases that cite 
North Carolina’s Rule 9( j ) reveals that none contain the words “Erie” or “Hanna.”  See, 
e.g., Gregory v. Schatzman, No. 08-0497, 2009 WL 3151867, at *2, *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 
24, 2009) (failing to consider choice-of-law concerns while noting that North Carolina 
Rule 9( j ) requires that a certification statement be placed “in the complaint itself 
when filed” and ultimately granting defendant’s Federal Rule 12(c) motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings because of plaintiff’s failure to comply with North Carolina 
Rule 9( j )).  Obviously, these statutes may receive increased scrutiny in federal court in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove. 
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Third Circuit focused on this distinction when it ruled that New Jer-
sey’s statute was applicable in federal court.147  In its ruling, the court 
noted that the affidavit required by New Jersey’s statute—which plain-
tiffs need not file until 60 days (extendable to 120 days) after the de-
fendant files her answer—“is not a pleading, is not filed until after the 
pleadings are closed, and does not contain a statement of the factual 
basis for the claim.”148 
A mere difference in timing, however, is not an automatic guaran-
tee that the statute does not offend federal pleading rules.  As the 
amount of time between the filing of the complaint and the date on 
which the plaintiff must file her certificate or affidavit decreases—
especially if it shrinks to a point at which plaintiffs will be submitting 
the certificate before defendants are likely to have filed a 12(b)(6) 
motion for dismissal149—the change in timing becomes less and less 
convincing as a reason why the statute does not conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules governing pleading.  However, in New Jersey’s case, the in-
terval is sufficiently lengthy so as not to significantly disrupt the feder-
al pleading process and requirements.  The Third Circuit concluded 
that, because the Federal Rules and the New Jersey statute serve dif-
ferent purposes (notice to defense versus the prevention of frivolous 
lawsuits, respectively), and because the mechanics of the New Jersey 
statute did not impede the operation of Rules 8 and 9, Walker con-
trolled and the two enactments could operate “side by side, ‘each con-
 
147 See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We find no 
direct conflict between the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute and Federal Rules 8 
and 9.”). 
148 Id.  In RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., the 
court compared New Jersey’s professional negligence affidavit of merit requirement to 
a similar Georgia statute that federal courts in Georgia have generally found to be in-
applicable in diversity suits.  981 F. Supp. 334, 343-44 (D.N.J. 1997).  The court noted 
first that New Jersey’s statute required filing sixty days after the defendant files her an-
swer, whereas Georgia’s statute required contemporaneous filing.  Id.  The court then 
noted that New Jersey’s statute only requires that the affidavit state that “there exists a 
reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable 
professional or occupational standards or treatment practices,” whereas the Georgia 
statute requires that the affidavit “set forth specifically at least one negligent act or 
omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each claim.”  Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010) and GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 2008)). 
149 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (requiring the affidavit be filed within six-
ty days from when the defendant files an answer), and MO. REV. STAT. § 538.225 (2000) 
(within ninety days of filing a complaint), with ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006) 
(within thirty days of filing a complaint), invalidated by Summerville v. Thrower, 253 
S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007). 
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trolling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’”150  It is 
doubtful, in light of Ricoh and Shady Grove, whether the Third Circuit’s 
“different purposes” argument could stand alone, but the lengthy pe-
riod between pleading and the affidavit filing deadline make the Third 
Circuit’s holding a reasonable one. 
c.  The 12(b)(6) Question 
Any argument suggesting that certificate of merit requirements do 
not conflict with Rule 8 because they do not constitute a part of the 
pleading requirement encounters problems if it foresees dismissing a 
complaint filed without the certificate under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
for failure to state a claim.  The Third Circuit commented that al-
though New Jersey’s statute directs courts to dismiss lawsuits for “fail-
ure to state a claim” when the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of me-
rit, this consequence was not an indication that the affidavit of merit 
statute affected pleading standards.151  The court concluded that the 
statutory language was merely the “legislature’s way of saying that the 
consequences of a failure to file [the affidavit] shall be the same as 
those of a failure to state a claim,” namely dismissal with prejudice un-
less “extraordinary circumstances” are found.152 
Other federal courts have routinely granted 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss for failure to adhere to a certificate of merit statute.153  If one 
 
150 Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 
740, 752 (1980)). 
151 See id. at 160-61 (“Contrary to the plaintiff’s suggestion, we do not read this sti-
pulation as implying that a failure to file the required affidavit somehow renders plead-
ings insufficient that would otherwise be sufficient.”).   
152 Id. (citing Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 415 (N.J. 1998)).  An alternative 
substance/procedure framework might lead to the conclusion that if a statute specifical-
ly states that failure to file the certificate of merit leaves the plaintiff susceptible to dis-
missal for failure to state a claim, then the statute is per se substantive.  In other words, 
if failure to state a claim is the legal result of noncompliance, then compliance logically 
must be an element of the claim.  Elements of the claim are substantive law.   
 There are several counters to this argument.  As the Third Circuit observed, the 
demurrer remedy is possibly just the state’s way of establishing the method of dismissal, 
not necessarily the legal rationale behind dismissal.  Id.  It is also possible to argue that 
successfully stating a claim logically has two components:  the substantive claim itself 
and the procedural act of stating it properly for the court.  Viewed in this light, the af-
fidavit requirement does not have to be considered part of the substantive legal claim.  
More importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, this sort of logical parsing of the 
substance/procedure distinction is not grounded in the Supreme Court’s Hanna juri-
sprudence and will not help answer the doctrinal question that this Section discusses. 
153 See, e.g., Donnelly v. O’Malley & Langan, P.C., No. 08-1945, 2009 WL 3241662, 
at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2009) (granting a motion to dismiss due to plaintiff’s failure 
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accepts this Comment’s argument that certificate of merit statutes that 
heighten pleading requirements are incompatible with Rules 8 and 9, 
and that the only reason that statutes like the one in New Jersey do not 
directly conflict with Rule 8 is because they do not affect the pleading 
standard, an interesting question arises.  If the affidavits are not part of 
the pleading process, is it proper to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to punish 
a plaintiff who has not filed one? 
Rule 12(d) specifies that 
[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.  All parties 
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is 
pertinent to the motion.
154
 
If the consideration of materials outside the pleadings triggers a 
12(b)(6) motion to be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment, it certainly seems logical to infer that a 12(b)(6) motion 
arguing that certain materials outside of the pleadings are missing 
should have the same effect.  Of course, if the court treats the motion 
as one for summary judgment, the plaintiff should receive an oppor-
tunity to conduct discovery, thereby defeating the purpose of the cer-
tificate of merit statute.155  Ultimately, as with other motions to dismiss 
aside from those listed in Rule 12(b), the decision of how to treat a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a 
state statute lies in the discretion of the court.156  However, when con-
sidering such motions, courts should pay close attention to Rule 12(d) 
and its tendency to require the procedural protections of Rule 56 (in-
cluding a chance for discovery). 
 
to file a certificate of merit or demonstrate a reasonable excuse for such failure), aff’d, 
370 F. App’x 347 (3d Cir. 2010).  
154 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
155 Presumably, plaintiffs who are unable to find an expert witness to support their 
negligence theory will be unable to proceed past the summary judgment stage in states 
that require the standard of care to be established by expert witnesses.  See, e.g., Dodd 
v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 204 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (“In malpractice 
cases, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment when it is shown that the plaintiff 
has no qualified expert to testify as to the applicable standard of care.”).  Thus, the 
purpose of the certificate of merit statutes is implicitly to require dismissal of frivolous-
ly filed suits before discovery and summary judgment. 
156 See 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1360, at 77-78 (commenting that 
the trial judge’s discretion typically governs how the court handles preliminary mo-
tions to dismiss not enumerated in Rule 12(b)). 
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d.  The Role of Twombly and Iqbal 
It might be natural to assume that Twombly157 and Iqbal 158 make it 
less likely that certificate of merit statutes conflict with the Federal 
Rules.  After all, by heightening the federal pleading standard, Twom-
bly and Iqbal have elevated the requirements for a minimally sufficient 
complaint closer to the standards espoused in certificate of merit sta-
tutes.  But these cases actually make it more likely that certificate of 
merit statutes conflict with the federal pleading rules. 
In the wake of Twombly, some practitioners thought the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement that a pleading must provide enough factual 
material to support a plausible inference of wrongdoing might apply 
only to Sherman Act antitrust actions, prompting the respondent in 
Iqbal to assert that the Twombly decision was so limited in scope.159  The 
Court, however, concluded that the respondent’s argument was “not 
supported by Twombly” and was “incompatible” with the Federal 
Rules.160  The Court explicitly clarified that Rule 8 “governs the plead-
ing standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.’”161  This statement confirmed that while Twombly may 
have raised the overall pleading standard, it did not undermine the 
standard’s uniformity.  The Court’s prior rejections of heightened 
standards for specific actions (Rule 9 aside) remain undisturbed.162  As 
those who wrote on the potential conflict between the Federal Rules 
of pleading and certificate of merit statutes before Twombly ob-
served,163 it is difficult to square the Supreme Court’s blunt statements 
on the transsubstantive uniformity of Rule 8’s application with the no-
tion that state statutes requiring more at the pleading stage might not 
conflict with that Rule. 
 
157 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
158 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
159 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly 
should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute.”). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
162 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 515 (2002) 
(“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited excep-
tions [such as those in Rule 9]. . . . [T]he Federal rules do not contain a heightened 
pleading requirement for employment discrimination suits.” (emphasis added)); Lea-
therman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168-69 (1993) (holding that federal courts cannot apply pleading standards more ri-
gorous than those enunciated in Rule 8 for civil rights cases).   
163 For an excellent discussion of the relationship between a uniform pleading 
standard in federal court and state certificate of merit statutes, see Penrose & Caldwell, 
supra note 58. 
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Twombly and Iqbal have had a second impact on this discussion.  
Some federal courts, typically those invoking Walker, have justified 
holding that state statutes do not conflict with Rule 8 by asserting that 
Rule 8’s sole purpose is to give notice to litigants, whereas the certifi-
cate of merit statutes filter out frivolous lawsuits.164  Although the 
Court’s rulings in Ricoh and Shady Grove cast doubt on the assumption 
that different policies can excuse otherwise conflicting rules from the 
reach of Hanna,165 even if one were to accept that assumption as a va-
lid legal principle, the Court’s recent pleading jurisprudence makes 
that principle inapposite to the Rule 8 question.  By injecting plausi-
bility into the Rule 8 analysis, the Court has asserted that, in addition 
to providing notice of claims and defenses, Rule 8 plays a role in es-
tablishing that a plaintiff’s claims have at least a chance of being meri-
torious.  The plausibility standard that the Court has read into Rule 8 
suggests that Rule 8 gauges the sufficiency of notice and likelihood of 
merit at the pleading stage.166 
3.  Rule 11 
Because the purpose of certificate of merit statutes is to prevent 
the filing of frivolous malpractice suits, it should be unsurprising that 
there are conflicts with Rule 11, which contains its own procedures for 
ensuring that claims are meritorious.  Rule 11 raises three concerns 
about possible conflicts between certificate of merit statutes and the 
Federal Rules:  (1) Rule 11 explicitly states that verifications or affida-
vits need not be filed with the complaint; (2) certificate of merit sta-
tutes require a more rigorous verification or certification by the par-
ties than what is required by Rule 11; and (3) the mandatory penalties 
that some of these statutes contain interfere with the Court’s discre-
tion to sanction attorneys who file frivolous claims. 
 
164 See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The 
rules’ overall purpose is to provide notice of the claims and defenses of the par-
ties. . . . Its purpose is not to give notice of the plaintiff’s claim, but rather to assure that 
malpractice claims for which there is no expert support will be terminated at an early 
stage in the proceedings.”); RTC Mortg. Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 981 
F. Supp. 334, 342 (D.N.J. 1997) (“The central purpose of the modern ‘short and plain 
statement’ standard is to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests,’ and not much more.” (citing Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))). 
165 See supra notes 104, 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
treatment of state policies under Erie analysis). 
166 As discussed in Subsection II.A.2, supra, Hanna suggests that when the Federal 
Rules set the sufficiency standard for a particular procedural device, state statutes es-
tablishing a more rigorous standard will not be enforced. 
GROSSBERG_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  9:55 AM 
2010] Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform 251 
a.  Rule 11’s Qualified Rejection of Verifications or Affidavits 
Rule 11 provides that “[u]nless a rule or statute specifically states 
otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affi-
davit.”167  It does not specify whether the “rule or statute” exception 
applies only to federal enactments or whether state statutes can also 
override the exception. 
Resolution of this question could be dispositive.  If the exception 
contemplates inclusion of state statutes, at minimum those statutes 
would not conflict with Rule 11, and one could argue that the excep-
tion specifically allows application of all certificate of merit statutes no 
matter what other rules they may disrupt.  On the other hand, if one 
were to interpret the “rule or statute” exception as applying to federal 
enactments only, then the rule is squarely in conflict with state statutes 
requiring otherwise. 
Scholars and practitioners have paid this topic remarkably little at-
tention.168  Both Wright and Miller’s treatise and Moore’s treatise as-
sert that the exception applies to federal rules and statutes only, but 
neither does much to justify its conclusion.169  Interestingly, every case 
that has considered this question in the context of certificate of merit 
statutes has found that the exception does include state statutes, whe-
reas virtually every other case that has considered the question in oth-
er contexts has concluded that state statutes are excluded.170  The 
 
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
168 Only one article, published over fifty years ago, has focused on this question.  
See Royal H. Brin, Jr., Verification of Pleadings in Federal Court As Affected by Requirements of 
State Statutes, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 219, 223 (1958) (concluding that “it would now seem 
to be at least reasonably safe for even a cautious practitioner to omit verification of 
pleadings in federal court where it would be required by state statute or rule”). 
169 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, at § 11.10[2], at 11-18 (“A pleading does not 
have to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit, unless there is a specific provision 
to that effect in a federal rule or statute.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); 5A 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1339, at 810-11 (“[T]he language presumably re-
fers to federal statutes and rules, which means that a federal court need not follow a 
forum state practice requiring verification or the attachment of an affidavit to the 
pleadings.”); see also 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:  RULES 
AND COMMENTARY 162 (2010) (“[Rule 11] supersedes any contrary state law verifica-
tion requirement.”). 
170 Compare Velazquez v. UPMC Bedford Mem’l Hosp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556 
(W.D. Pa. 2004) (“Rule 11 states ‘except when otherwise specifically provided by rule 
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.’ . . . [The Rule] 
can co-exist with a state affidavit of merit statute . . . .”), RTC Mortg. Trust 1994 N-1 v. 
Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 345 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Rule 11 specifically al-
lows room for the operation of other statutes which may require an affidavit.”), and 
Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Kishwaukee Valley Med. Grp., No. 86-1483, 1986 WL 
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leading modern case addressing the topic is Farzana K. v. Indiana De-
partment of Education.171  The Farzana opinion, authored by Judge Eas-
terbrook and joined by Judges Posner and Ripple, invoked the Su-
preme Court’s Hanna jurisprudence to support its conclusion that 
state statutes do not fit the exception.  The court reasoned that 
“[r]ules established under the Rules Enabling Act supersede state 
norms.”172  Though the panel reached the correct conclusion, it did so 
for the wrong reason. 
In Gasperini, when explaining why enforcement of New York’s 
standard for overturning excessive jury verdicts did not conflict with 
Rule 59, the Court explained that although Rule 59 provided the pro-
cedural vehicle for requesting a new trial, that request should be eva-
luated in accordance with the New York state standard.173  Thus, it is 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding to assert that Rule 11 does 
not permit the incorporation of state law in its operation because it is 
part of the greater collection of Federal Rules. 
A superior approach would look to the Federal Rule’s intent.  
Both history and logic suggest that the exception is meant to apply on-
ly to federal enactments.  The original Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Rule 11 cites only federal statutes as examples of statutes requiring 
that pleadings be verified.174  Moreover, the language of the Note sug-
gests that the rulemakers’ concern was assuring that the continuity of 
certain federal statutes was not disrupted.  The rulemakers observed 
that the “rule expressly continues any statute which requires a plead-
ing to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.”175  The Rules Enabl-
 
11381, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1986) (“That § 2-622 is not a federal statute is irrelevant.  
There is nothing in Rule 11 which limits the exception only to federal statutes.”), with 
Farzana K. v. Indiana Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[Rule 11(a)] 
means federal rule or federal statute, because state requirements for pleading do not 
apply in federal litigation.”), Follenfant v. Rogers, 359 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(“[S]tate rules requiring verified pleadings . . . are wholly inapposite.”), and Fimbres v. 
Chapel Mortgage Corp., No. 09-0886, 2009 WL 4163332, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 
2009) (“[A] federal court need not follow a forum state practice requiring verifica-
tion.”(citing Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705)). 
171 Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705.  This case is cited in numerous cases and secondary 
sources.  See, e.g., Fimbres, 2009 WL 4163332, at *6; H.H. ex rel. Hough v. Ind. Bd. of 
Special Educ. Appeals, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (N.D. Ind. 2007); GENSLER, supra 
note 169, at 162; 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, § 11.10, at 11-18 n.7. 
172 Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (discussing Gasperini’s incorporation 
of state legal standards into the operation of a Federal Rule). 
174 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1937) (listing as examples 28 
U.S.C. §§ 381, 762, and 829). 
175 Id. 
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ing Act, of course, did not give the rulemakers the ability to disconti-
nue in toto the operation of any state statutes.  It did, however, give 
them the ability to supersede already existing federal laws under 
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).176  The exception thus makes sense as a declara-
tion that the rulemakers were not exercising their explicitly granted 
ability to supersede already existing federal laws. 
The remarks of one of the Federal Rules’ primary architects sup-
ports this understanding of the rulemakers’ intent.  In a 1941 article, 
Judge Charles E. Clark declared that “[R]ule 11 does away with the all 
too barren formality of an oath to pleadings.”177  The sweeping nature 
of Judge Clark’s language suggests that any exceptions to the changes 
made by Rule 11 would be few.  There is also a lengthy body of case 
law denying the enforcement of state law verification requirements 
without consideration of the “rule or statute” exception.178  In light of 
judicial precedent, the apparent intent of Rule 11, and the overall 
federal orientation of the Rule’s structure, the logical conclusion is 
that the exception applies only to federal enactments. 
b.  The Heightened Verification and Certification Requirement Implemented by 
Certificate of Merit Statutes 
Rule 11 requires that at least one attorney of record sign every 
pleading.179  By signing a complaint, the filing attorney declares, to the 
best of her knowledge after a reasonable inquiry under the circums-
tances, that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are war-
ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and 
“the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
 
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”). 
177 Clark, supra note 136, at 463 (emphasis added). 
178 See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1339, at 810 n.4, 811 n.5 (collecting 
cases in which federal courts rejected adherence to state verification laws).  Of course, 
it is possible to speculate whether Shady Grove provides any clues as to how the current 
Supreme Court might rule if confronted with this question.  To the extent that Shady 
Grove represents a preference for federal domination of procedure, the opinion sug-
gests that the exception is limited to federal enactments.  However, Shady Grove also 
represents a preference for a mechanical reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.  Justices espousing such a viewpoint might well reject adding an exclusively fed-
eral limitation to the text of the exception. 
179 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
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identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery.”180 
Problematically, certificate of merit statutes requiring the attorney 
to file a certificate stating that she has consulted with an expert seem 
to heighten this requirement.  Rule 11 indicates that by signing a 
pleading, the attorney is averring both to the nonfrivolity of claims 
presented therein and to the fact that she has made a reasonable in-
quiry into the complaint’s contents.181  The Rule explicitly states that 
no other verifications or affidavits are required.182 
This Rule is too broad to leave room for the operation of a statute 
like Florida’s, which requires that the attorney, after making a reason-
able investigation, include with her complaint “a certificate of counsel 
that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that 
grounds exist for an action against each named defendant.”183  Both 
Hanna and Shady Grove suggest that when the Federal Rules establish a 
sufficiency standard, that standard operates to the exclusion of more 
burdensome state laws.184 
A number of federal courts considering the question have come to 
the opposite answer, but their reasoning is questionable.  For example, 
in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that an analogous Colorado law did not conflict with Rule 11.185  
The court conceded that both rules “operate[] in a similar fashion” and 
that both “demonstrate an intent to weed unjustifiable claims out of the 
 
180 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). 
181 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)–(b). 
182 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“[A] pleading need not be verified or accompanied by 
an affidavit.”). 
183 FLA. STAT. § 766.104(1) (2010).  Good faith, in turn, exists when the attorney 
has received written opinions from experts.  Id. 
184 See supra notes 78-79, 121-23, and accompanying text. 
185 See 90 F.3d 1523, 1540 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Despite the superficial similarity of 
the two rules, we conclude that they do not collide.”).  This was a professional negli-
gence case governed under the same Colorado certificate of merit statute that applies 
to medical malpractice actions.  Id. at 1539.  The Colorado statute requires that the 
certificate of merit confirm  
(I) [t]hat the attorney has consulted a person who has expertise in the area of 
the alleged negligent conduct; and (II) [t]hat the professional who has been 
consulted pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) has reviewed the 
known facts, including such records, documents, and other materials which 
the professional has found to be relevant to the allegations of negligent con-
duct and, based on the review of such facts, has concluded that the filing of 
the claim, counterclaim, or cross claim does not lack substantial justification.   
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(3)(a) (2008). 
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system.”186  Nevertheless, despite the “superficial similarity,” the Tenth 
Circuit concluded the rules did not collide for two reasons.187 
First, the court noted that Rule 11 targets attorneys (and pro se 
parties) whereas the Colorado statute penalizes the parties directly.188  
However, this is a fair representation of neither Rule 11 nor Col-
orado’s statute.  Both rules require the attorney to sign or execute the 
requisite document.189  As for deterrence, Colorado’s statute requires 
dismissal of the claim if the attorney fails to file the certificate.190  
Rule 11 calls for unsigned papers to be struck and allows sanctions for 
papers signed in bad faith.191  It is difficult to understand the Tenth 
Circuit’s analysis here.  Noncompliance under either rule results in the 
case not moving forward (it is difficult to proceed when one’s com-
plaint has been struck), punishing both the party and the attorney (es-
pecially considering that most of the affected plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
be operating on a contingency basis).  Furthermore, Rule 11’s text and 
the Advisory Committee Notes make it abundantly clear that sanctions 
can be applied to either the attorneys or the parties themselves.192 
The Tenth Circuit’s second argument is also puzzling.  The court 
asserted that the statute and Federal Rule do not conflict because the 
state statute has an additional purpose.193  The court explained that in 
addition to weeding out frivolous claims, the Colorado statute also 
seeks “‘to expedite the litigation process’” by imposing a time limit on 
the certificate.194  Again, this reasoning is questionable because the 
Federal Rules require confirmation that a filing is nonfrivoulous at the 
time of filing, not sixty days later as required by the Colorado statute.  
Moreover, Ricoh held that the fact that policies are not perfectly coex-
tensive does not guarantee enforcement of an otherwise conflicting 
state rule.195  Shady Grove added that federalism concerns regarding 
 
186 Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading . . . must be signed by at least 
one attorney . . . .”), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(3)(a) (2008) (“A certificate of 
review shall be executed by the attorney . . . .”). 
190 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(4).  
191 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)–(c). 
192 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The 
sanction should be imposed on the persons—whether attorneys, law firms, or parties—
who have violated the rule . . . .”). 
193 See Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540. 
194 Id. (quoting Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 251 (Colo. 1992)). 
195 See supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing the Ricoh Court’s disregard 
for differing policy rationales). 
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state policies will be considered only in generalized evaluations of the 
Rule’s validity under the Rules Enabling Act.196  Both decisions suggest 
that the Tenth Circuit’s arguments are unavailing.197 
Other courts have made arguments similar to those of the Tenth 
Circuit.  For instance, in Hill v. Morrison, the district court concluded 
that Rule 11 does not conflict with Missouri’s affidavit requirement 
because Missouri has a state rule of civil procedure modeled on 
Rule 11 that operates in state court concomitantly with the affidavit of 
merit statute.198  This argument is astonishingly similar to the one the 
Supreme Court considered and rejected in Burlington Northern.199 
c.  Discretion to Punish Under Rule 11 
The most troublesome concern regarding Rule 11 arises over the 
question of punishment for noncompliance or compliance in bad 
faith.  Rule 11(c) commits to the discretion of the trial judge the deci-
sion of whether to impose sanctions for a violation of Rule 11(b)’s 
good faith certification requirement, whereas many certificate of me-
rit statutes make punishment mandatory for failing to file a certificate 
or filing in bad faith.200  The Court’s ruling in Burlington Northern is di-
rectly on point here.  Just as the Court ruled that Alabama’s mandato-
ry penalty for losing parties at the appellate level would interfere with 
 
196 See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing the Shady Grove Court’s un-
derstanding of the relevance of state regulatory policies when interpreting ambiguous 
Federal Rules). 
197 Obviously, this Comment does not fault the Tenth Circuit or any other court 
for failing to foresee the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove. 
198 See 870 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“Just as section 538.225 and Mis-
souri Rule 55.03 can both apply in state court without conflict, so too both section 
538.225 and Rule 11 can be given effect in federal court in a diversity action.”).  
199 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987) (concluding that it 
was irrelevant that Alabama’s law punishing frivolous appeals operated side by side 
with a state law based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38). 
200 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The 
court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be im-
posed for a violation . . . .”), with FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (declaring that if an at-
torney did not file in good faith, “the court shall award attorney’s fees and taxable costs 
against claimant’s counsel, and shall submit the matter to The Florida Bar for discipli-
nary review of the attorney” (emphasis added)) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-
122(d)(3) (Supp. 2009) (“[T]he court shall award appropriate sanctions against the 
attorney . . . . [T]he court shall forward the order to the board of professional respon-
sibility for appropriate action. . . . [T]he court shall, upon motion, require the party or 
party’s counsel to post a bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per 
adverse party in any future medical malpractice case to secure payment of sanctions for 
any violation of this section in such case.” (emphasis added)). 
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a judge’s discretion to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals, a state 
statute mandating that a judge impose sanctions for failure to file a 
certificate of merit in good faith interferes with the judge’s discretion 
as to whether and how to punish a party who has knowingly filed a fri-
volous complaint.201 
Although the Supreme Court has twice found a mandatory state 
statute to conflict with a discretionary Federal Rule,202 the mandato-
ry/discretionary distinction was cited at least once as a reason why a 
Federal Rule and state statute did not conflict.  In RTC Mortgage Trust 
1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., to support its holding 
that the New Jersey statute did not conflict with Rule 11, the court ob-
served that “the Affidavit of Merit statute mandates that failure to con-
sult with and provide an affidavit from an expert ‘shall be deemed a 
failure to state a cause of action.’  Rule 11, on the other hand, makes 
sanctions discretionary.”203 
Contrary to the court’s understanding in RTC Mortgage Trust, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that state rules that extinguish the 
discretion federal judges possess, especially in the context of penalizing 
parties for frivolous actions, conflict with Federal Rules providing that 
discretion and therefore should not be enforced in federal court. 
4.  Rules 26 and 37 
Certificate of merit statutes that require the plaintiff to disclose 
substantive information concerning the opinions of the consulted ex-
pert conflict with the disclosure and discovery provisions of the Feder-
al Rules in three ways:  (1) they destroy the discretion that a trial 
judge has over the timing of expert-report disclosures; (2) they may 
disrupt protections in the Federal Rules against discovery of advice 
from nontestifying experts; and (3) they destroy the trial judge’s dis-
cretion to punish noncompliant parties. 
 
201 See Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7 (“Thus, the Rule’s discretionary mode of operation 
unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty 
statute.”). 
202 See id.; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-32 (1988) (finding that 
the mandatory Alabama law against enforcement of forum selection clauses destroyed 
the discretion the federal venue-transfer statute provided). 
203 981 F. Supp 334, 345 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-19 (West 
Supp. 2010)).   
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a.  Disclosure Timing 
Rule 26(a)(2)(C) gives the trial court discretion to determine 
when parties must disclose the identities and reports of any expert 
witnesses.204  The statutes of a number of states completely destroy this 
discretion. 
At the extreme, Texas’s statute comes close to implementing its 
own disclosure and discovery scheme, requiring that within 120 days 
of filing a complaint, the plaintiff serve each defendant with a full ex-
pert report and curriculum vitae.205  The mandatory 120-day time limit 
is in direct conflict with Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s discretionary timing.  
Most federal courts that have considered whether Texas’s law applies 
in diversity suits have concluded that it does not.206 
As with Rules 8, 9, 11, and 12, courts in other states have found no 
conflict, but their reasoning is again suspect.  Minnesota’s statute re-
quires that within 180 days of filing a complaint, the plaintiff must pro-
duce signed affidavits containing detailed reports from experts who are 
expected to testify.207  In Ellingson v. Walgreen Co., the plaintiff argued 
that Minnesota’s statute conflicted with Rule 26(a).208  In rejecting the 
plaintiff’s argument, the trial court did not analyze the Erie issue.209  
Without citing Hanna or its progeny, the trial court merely listed four 
federal courts that had also applied the statute (only one of which had 
 
204 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C) (“A party must make these disclosures at the 
times and in the sequence that the court orders.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“Normally the court should prescribe a time 
for these disclosures . . . .”). 
205  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West Supp. 2009). 
206  For a thorough discussion of why federal courts should not enforce Texas’s 
law, see Poindexter v. Bonsukan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 800, 803-10 (E.D. Tex. 2001).  Accord 
Hall v. Trisun, No. 05-0984, 2006 WL 1788192, at *2-4 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2006); Gar-
za v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 234 F.R.D. 617, 621-23 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Brown v. 
Brooks Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 04-0329, 2005 WL 1515466, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 
2005); Nelson v. Myrick, No. 04-0828, 2005 WL 723459, at *2-4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 
2005); McDaniel v. United States, No. 04-0314, 2004 WL 2616305, at *5-9 (W.D. Tex. 
Nov. 16, 2004).  But see Cruz v. Chang, 400 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911-15 (W.D. Tex. 2005) 
(holding that Texas’s statute should apply in federal court).  A district court in South 
Dakota, applying North Dakota law, reached an identical conclusion to Poindexter and 
barred application of a similar North Dakota statute.  See Serocki v. MeritCare Health 
Sys., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1211 (D.S.D. 2004) (concluding that North Dakota’s affida-
vit requirement does not apply in federal court). 
207 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005) (requiring identification of expert 
witnesses, as well as “the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is ex-
pected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion”). 
208 See 78 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Plaintiffs particularly claim the 
1993 amendments to [Federal Rule] 26(a) preempt . . . § 145.682 in diversity cases.”).  
209 See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s argument summarily).  
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actually considered the Erie question) and concluded that the plaintiff’s 
argument “has been uniformly rejected by the federal courts.”210 
The one court cited in Ellingson that had considered the Erie issue 
also issued a suspect opinion.  In Oslund v. United States, an FTCA case 
in which the plaintiff asserted that Minnesota’s expert statue con-
flicted with the Federal Rules, the court cited an Eighth Circuit case as 
an example of an “action dismissed for failure to file an expert affida-
vit required by § 145.682.”211  However, in the cited case, the Eighth 
Circuit reversed a dismissal and held that the affidavit of merit statute 
did not apply because the plaintiffs filed their case before the statute 
became effective.212  The Oslund court, after misconstruing the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision, merely concluded that because dismissal under the 
statute is mandatory, the plaintiff was incorrect to characterize it as 
“purely procedural.”213  Therefore, “[a]fter careful consideration of 
the statute and cases construing it,” the court held that Minnesota’s 
statute “is not the sort of purely procedural rule which should be 
preempted by the Federal Rules in federal question cases.”214 
b.  Nontestifying Experts Under Rule 26 
A second potential conflict involves Rule 26(b)(4)(B), which 
states that, under ordinary circumstances, “a party may not, by inter-
rogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party 
in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not ex-
 
210 Id.  For an extended discussion of the decision in Ellingson, see Poindexter, 145 
F. Supp. 2d at 805-06. 
211 701 F. Supp. 710, 713 (D. Minn. 1988) (construing Hughes v. Mayo Clinic, 834 
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
212 See Hughes, 834 F.2d at 715 (“Since [the Minnesota statute] does not apply to 
suits commenced prior to August 1, 1986, the requirement of expert review does not 
apply to the Hughes’ suit.”). 
213 Oslund, 701 F. Supp. at 713-14. 
214 Id. at 714.  In case readers are concerned that the difference between FTCA 
and diversity cases makes this decision irrelevant, the court explained that its ruling 
was ensuring conformity between FTCA and diversity actions.  See id. (“If the contrary 
was true, the anomalous result would be that the federal government would be ex-
posed to liability when a cause of action involving similar conduct would be dismissed 
in a diversity case . . . .”).  It is also interesting that this decision, which did not mention 
a single Supreme Court opinion in the entire Erie line of cases, seemed to suggest that 
the Federal Rules only trumped if the state rule was “purely procedural.”  Id. at 714.  As 
the Supreme Court noted in Hanna, matters “falling within the uncertain area between 
substance and procedure[] are rationally capable of classification as either.”  Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
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pected to be called as a witness at trial.”215  The Advisory Committee’s 
Note goes as far as to suggest that a “proper showing” is required even 
to obtain the names of nontestifying experts.216 
Rule 26 thus gives parties a qualified right to protect from discovery 
the opinions, and sometimes even the identities, of experts whom they 
will not call to testify.  Statutes requiring the disclosure of expert opi-
nions and identities, without regard to whether the party intends to call 
the expert as a witness, necessarily interfere with this right.  Unless the 
plaintiff knows that the affiant-expert will testify, an affidavit of merit 
statute forces the plaintiff to disclose advice from the affiant that the 
Rules make undiscoverable.  It appears that no court to date has consi-
dered whether state certificate of merit statutes conflict with 
Rule 26(b)(4)(B), but there is a strong argument that they do.217 
c.  Punishment for Noncompliance Under Rule 37 
The last potential conflict with the Federal Rules governing dis-
covery involves punishment for noncompliance.  Under Rule 37(c), if 
a party fails to disclose an expert report or identify a witness as re-
quired by Rule 26(a), the default penalty is exclusion of that witness 
from the trial.218  However, Rule 37 entrusts the trial judge with great 
discretion to modify the penalty in a number of ways, ranging from 
postponing the proceedings until the delinquent party discloses the 
information to dismissing the action and awarding attorneys’ fees to 
the other side.219  When a state statute contains mandatory penalties 
for failing to produce an expert report by a specific date, it extin-
guishes the judge’s discretion to impose the penalty she sees fit. 
For example, Texas’s statute requires that a court dismiss a com-
plaint with prejudice and award attorneys’ fees and court costs to the 
 
215 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).  Excepted from this Rule are experts conducting a 
physical or mental examination ordered pursuant to Rule 35(b) and instances where 
“exceptional circumstances” make it “impracticable for the party to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by other means.”  Id. 26(b)(4)(B)(i)–(ii). 
216 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“[A] party 
may on a proper showing require the other party to name experts retained or specifi-
cally employed . . . .”); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, § 2032, at 101-105 (2010) (discussing the meaning of “proper show-
ing”). 
217 One question that may arise is whether Rule 26(b)(4)(B) impermissibly creates 
a privilege.  That question, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
219 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi) (listing the orders that a court 
may issue in response to a party’s failure to comply with Rule 37(a)). 
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defendant if the plaintiff has not served each defendant with an ex-
pert report within 120 days of filing her complaint.220  Under the prin-
ciples of Burlington Northern and Ricoh, Rule 37 is sufficiently broad to 
control the question of how to punish those who do not submit expert 
reports, leaving no room for operation of the state statutes.221  Enforc-
ing the Texas statute would extinguish the discretion granted under 
the Federal Rules.  As the court in Poindexter v. Bonsukan observed, 
even though the mandatory penalties under Texas law are within the 
range of what a judge could order under Rule 37, the rules conflict 
because they “cannot operate simultaneously without one being sub-
ordinated to the other.”222 
B.  The Two Prongs of Hanna:  A Paradox 
A thorough examination of state certificate of merit statutes, the 
Federal Rules, and Hanna and its progeny show that, being faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s holdings as a whole, almost all certificate of me-
rit statutes conflict with at least one Federal Rule and should not be 
enforced in federal court. 
But what about the borderline cases?  What about the certificates 
that are due long after pleading has concluded, do not require the 
submission of substantive expert opinions, and do not interfere with a 
judge’s discretion in punishing frivolous or otherwise misbehaving  
litigants? 
Hanna stated that if there is no direct conflict between a Federal 
Rule and state law, courts should apply the modified outcome-
determination test to see if the state law must be given effect over the 
traditional federal practice.223  However, this instruction comes with a 
warning.  If one analyzes the outcome-determination test by compar-
ing what happens to a litigant who adheres to a procedural require-
ment with one who does not, then “every procedural variation is ‘out-
come-determinative.’”224  Instead, courts should apply the outcome-
determination test with an eye to the “the twin aims of the Erie rule:  
 
220 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009). 
221 See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discusing how Burlington North-
ern and Ricoh found the discretion granted to trial courts by Rule 38 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), respectively, conflicted with nondiscretionary state law provisions). 
222 145 F. Supp. 2d 800, 809 (E.D. Tex. 2001). 
223 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-71 (1965). 
224 Id. at 468-69. 
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discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws.”225 
In light of Hanna, this Section will apply the outcome-
determination test to New Jersey’s statute because, as the country’s 
most innocuous certificate of merit statute, it is the statute least likely 
to interfere with any of the Federal Rules.  New Jersey’s statute re-
quires that within 60 days (extendable to 120 days) of receiving the de-
fendant’s answer, the plaintiff file an affidavit from a sufficiently quali-
fied expert stating that there is at least a “reasonable probability” that 
the defendant’s care fell outside the professional norm.226 
The Third Circuit in Chamberlain began its modified outcome-
determination analysis of New Jersey’s statute by commenting that the 
statute is “outcome determinative on its face.”227  The court explained 
that because litigants who did not comply with the statute would face 
dismissal, “failure to apply the statute in a federal diversity action 
where no affidavit of merit has been filed would produce a different 
outcome than that mandated in a state proceeding.”228  This is precisely 
the syllogistic conception of outcome determination that Hanna 
warned reduces the test to a truism. 
The Third Circuit then analyzed the statute under the twin aims 
of Erie.  The court concluded that failure to enforce the statute would 
lead to forum shopping because a plaintiff in federal court who is 
“unable to secure expert support” might nevertheless “be able to sur-
vive beyond the pleading stage and secure discovery.”229  This argu-
ment has a number of problems.  First, it raises internal consistency 
questions because the same court that earlier refused to characterize 
New Jersey’s certificate of merit statute as a pleading requirement lat-
er associated adherence to the statute with survival beyond the plead-
ing stage.230  Still more relevant to the question at hand, the Third 
Circuit’s argument is based on the erroneous assumption that discov-
ery does not occur until after the plaintiff serves his affidavit. 
 
225 Id. 
226 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010). 
227 Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000). 
228 Id. at 161. 
229 Id.  The opinion goes on to raise the specter of the “fishing expedition.”  Id. 
230 Compare id. at 160 (distinguishing Rules 8 and 9 from the state statute on the 
ground that only the former govern pleadings), with id. at 161 (discussing the potential 
for plaintiffs with little expert support to “survive beyond the pleading stage” in federal 
court). 
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On the contrary, in terms of document production, if the physi-
cian-defendants fail to provide any of the plaintiff’s relevant medical 
records, the affidavit requirement is waived.231  As for disclosure, inter-
rogatories, and depositions, formal discovery proceeds over the 60 
days (extendable to 120 days on a showing of good cause) between 
when the defendant serves his answer and when the plaintiff must 
serve his affidavit.232  In a medical malpractice action, with a limited 
number of potential deponents, it is unlikely that plaintiffs’ counsel 
might hope to achieve a markedly more intrusive “fishing expedition” 
in federal court than she could achieve in state court given 120 days of 
discovery and full access to the relevant documents. 
As for the inequitable administration of justice, the Third Circuit 
concluded that defendants in federal court would be “unfairly ex-
posed to additional litigation time and expense before the dismissal of 
a non-meritorious lawsuit.”233  Again, this assertion is questionable.  
Presumably, either 60 or 120 days after the defendant files his answer, 
a plaintiff unable to secure expert support would be tossed out of state 
court for failure to adhere to the affidavit of merit statute.  The result 
would not be markedly different in federal court.  New Jersey substan-
tive law requires expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a 
malpractice action.234  If a plaintiff does not produce an expert affida-
vit stating that the standard of care was violated, a federal court will 
grant a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.235  At most, it 
seems that the defendant in federal court would be exposed to a long-
er period of discovery before she could win the case with prejudice.236 
 
231 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-28 (providing for a “sworn statement in lieu of the 
affidavit” when defendants are noncompliant). 
232 See Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 780, 785 (N.J. 2003) 
(noting that “[d]iscovery proceeded in the ordinary course” during the 120 days plain-
tiff had to file her affidavit of merit and instructing trial courts that part of discovery 
management is ensuring that plaintiff’s counsel is aware of affidavit requirements and 
deadlines). 
233 Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161. 
234 See Rosenberg ex rel. Rosenberg v. Cahill, 492 A.2d 371, 374 (N.J. 1985) (“It is 
generally recognized that in the ordinary medical malpractice case ‘the standard of 
practice to which [the defendant-practitioner] failed to adhere must be established by 
expert testimony . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 167 
A.2d 625 (N.J. 1966)). 
235 See, e.g., Wenner v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 04-3414, 2009 WL 1089555, at 
*6-7 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss a medical mal-
practice claim because plaintiff did not produce an expert affidavit stating that defen-
dant had violated the standard of care). 
236 Cf. Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal Rules of 
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The internal strain in the logic of Chamberlain is representative of 
a paradox built into Hanna that favors the application of federal law 
in this and analogous situations.  To hold that state law must be en-
forced, a federal court must minimize the scope of the state statute 
when deciding if the statute conflicts with the Federal Rules (“this 
isn’t a pleading requirement”) and then aggrandize the role of the 
statute when deciding if it is outcome determinative (“this statute de-
termines survival past the pleading stage”). 
In other words, the paradox is that the statutes that are most in-
nocuous in terms of procedural hurdles are least likely to conflict with 
a Federal Rule, but they are also much less likely to be outcome de-
terminative in a way that implicates the twin aims of Erie.  Conversely, 
the statutes that are more likely to be considered outcome determina-
tive should never reach the second stage of the analysis because they 
are so disruptive of the Federal Rules.  For example, few would argue 
that Georgia’s statute, which requires that the complaint be filed with 
a detailed expert report, would not encourage forum shopping.  But 
the federal courts in Georgia never reach that stage of the analysis be-
cause they always find that the statute conflicts with the Federal 
Rules.237 
III.  THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTES 
A faithful application of Hanna and its progeny suggests that cer-
tificate of merit statutes are not applicable in federal court.  The vast 
majority of the statutes conflict directly with at least one of the Federal 
Rules, and, in cases where the statute is so innocuous that it does not 
wander across the path of one of the Federal Rules, the very mildness 
that ensures it survives the first prong of Hanna spells its doom on the 
second prong. 
At the same time, certificate of merit statutes represent clear at-
tempts by the states to regulate substantive policy issues (namely, med-
ical malpractice), albeit through procedural reforms.  None of the 
tests enunciated by Hanna and its progeny for determining when a 
Federal Rule and a state law conflict requires treating a state proce-
 
Civil Procedure, 69 MISS. L.J. 715, 727 (1999) (criticizing the Trierweiler court for decid-
ing that Colorado’s statute was outcome determinative because “rejecting the state rule 
would merely postpone the stage at which some noncertifiable cases would be dis-
missed”). 
237 See, e.g., Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding a 
conflict between the Georgia expert-affidavit requirement and Rule 8(a)); Boone v. 
Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (same). 
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dural rule particular to one area of substantive law any differently 
than a transsubstantive state procedural rule.  This Part of the Com-
ment, in light of the “Hanna paradox” and the Court’s decision in 
Shady Grove, first considers whether Erie jurisprudence needs a major 
overhaul to allow easier enforcement of substantively motivated state 
litigation reforms in federal court.  Rejecting a major overhaul as im-
prudent, this Part then considers whether a more moderate reform of 
the Erie doctrine might be justified to protect federalism.  Concluding 
that a moderate revision of Erie is defensible, this Part then reconsid-
ers certificate of merit statutes in light of such a revision.  This Com-
ment’s conclusion is that, although certificate of merit statutes are not 
within the scope of state legislation that would be protected by a mi-
nor revision to the Erie doctrine, this result is acceptable because sub-
ordination of the statutes in federal court results in only minimal 
threats to federalism. 
Prior to Gasperini and Shady Grove, the Seventh Circuit determined 
that federal courts must consider whether state procedural reforms 
are limited to a substantive policy area.  In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Sewerage District, Judge Posner indicated that there are two 
categories of state procedural rules, the applicability of which presents 
a simple question for federal courts.238  The first category consists of 
state rules that squarely conflict with the Federal Rules.239  The second 
group “of pretty easy cases is where the state procedural rule, though 
undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited 
to a particular substantive area.”240  At the time, Judge Posner’s asser-
tion was supported by citations to other Seventh Circuit cases only.241  
The analysis described for such cases was not grounded in the Su-
preme Court’s Erie jurisprudence.242  Although Justice Ginsburg re-
 
238 See 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (“There are, however, two classes of pretty 
clear cases . . . .”). 
239 See id. (describing the first category of cases as those “in which the state rule is 
in actual conflict with one of the Federal Rules”). 
240 Id. 
241 See id. (citing several sources in reference to tort-specific rules, including Todd 
ex rel. Todd v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 942 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n. 1 (7th Cir. 
1991), Jones v. Griffith, 870 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir. 1989), and Hines v. Elkhart General 
Hospital, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
242 See id. (suggesting that the analysis for this group of cases turns on whether 
state goals are substantively designed); see also supra note 112 (criticizing Gasperini’s 
reliance upon Healy’s analysis). 
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troactively tried to incorporate Healy into the doctrine,243 the Court in 
Shady Grove, perhaps owing to changes in membership,244 rejected in-
corporating Healy’s concern for individual state policies into the Han-
na conflict analysis.245  This struggle is indicative of the perception of 
some that Hanna is inadequate when it comes to protecting state pre-
rogatives, especially when substantive state policies shape procedural 
litigation reforms. 
Several scholars have explicitly criticized Hanna’s tendency to 
trump substantively motivated state legislation.  Professor Lynch has 
argued that because Hanna prevents the enforcement of state litiga-
tion reform measures in federal court, the decision should be 
scrapped and replaced with a system of comparative impairment, un-
der which federal courts would determine the prevailing procedural 
law by asking whether the federal or state government would be more 
impaired if its law were subordinated.246  Lynch asserts that Hanna and 
the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act occurred before the Su-
preme Court or Congress could have foreseen the “litigation reform 
movement.”247  The implicit suggestion is that, had the Supreme Court 
and Congress known that states would attempt to control substantive 
areas of policy by regulating procedure, Hanna and the Rules Enabl-
ing Act would have been structured in a way that would allow the ef-
fectuation of state litigation reform in federal court.  However, despite 
the appeal of these arguments, they must fail. 
Professor Lynch’s argument that Hanna and the Rules Enabling 
Act predate the litigation reform movement is factually inaccurate.  
Tort reform movements, which tend to occur cyclically, date back to 
 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to 
install avoidance of conflict with state regulatory interests as a guiding principle in 
construing a Federal Rule’s scope). 
244 See supra note 120 (comparing the composition of the majority for Gasperini in 
1996 with its composition for Shady Grove in 2010).   
245 See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (explaining the Shady Grove ma-
jority’s rejection of a standard based on the subjective intent of state legislators). 
246 See John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie:  Saving State Litigation Reform 
Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2008) (urging either 
the Supreme Court or Congress to ensure “appropriate deference to state litigation 
reform measures in diversity cases” and suggesting comparative impairment as a means 
by which to do so); see also Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gas-
perini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (1998) (hoping that Gasperini signals a “heightened 
sensitivity” to any impact a Hanna ruling might have on state policy concerns). 
247 See Lynch, supra note 246, at 293-94 (asserting that the litigation reform move-
ment “could not even have been imagined by the Hanna Court in 1965” or by Con-
gress in 1934). 
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the nineteenth century.248  To the extent that his argument is accu-
rate—that states enacted the specific statutes about which he has 
voiced concern (including certificate of merit statutes) after Hanna 
and the Rules Enabling Act—this Comment draws a different conclu-
sion.  Because the states passed their statutes after the Court’s ruling 
in Hanna (and in most instances, after Burlington Northern and Ricoh), 
the states enacted their litigation reform with full notice that any re-
forms conflicting with the Federal Rules would not be enforced in 
federal court.  Instead of considering Hanna’s antecedence to state 
litigation-reform statutes as a reason to question Hanna’s validity, we 
should view Hanna as an indication that state legislatures knew or 
should have known that attempts to regulate tort claims via procedur-
al reforms in conflict with the Federal Rules (or, alternatively, proce-
dural reforms that are not outcome determinative with respect to the 
twin aims of Erie) would not affect claims in federal court. 
There is, however, a more compelling argument against a major 
overhaul of Hanna in order to accommodate state procedural litiga-
tion reform motivated by substantive concerns.  Although applying 
certificate of merit statutes in federal court may seem harmless in iso-
lation, allowing any state procedural reform that regulates a substan-
tive area of law to trump the Federal Rules would, in the aggregate, 
have a disastrous effect on the uniformity of practice in the federal 
courts.  Under such a system, the more states choose to regulate subs-
tantive policy through procedural reform, the more the resultant dis-
ruption to the uniformity of federal procedure would approach the 
level of disruption one would expect if the federal courts wholly ap-
plied transsubstantive state procedural rules.  As more state procedur-
al rules replace Federal Rules, procedure in the federal courts would 
begin to resemble federal procedure during the unsatisfactory days of 
the Conformity Act.249 
 
248 See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform 
in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 955-69 (2004) (discussing criti-
ques of the medical malpractice litigation system and proposals for reform in the nine-
teenth century); John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American 
Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1168-69 (2005) (discussing late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century enactments of state constitutional provisions designed to restrict 
wrongful death litigation).  
249 See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (9th ed. 2007) (characteriz-
ing the mixture of federal and state procedure under the Conformity Act as “rampant-
ly confusing”); Burbank, supra note 68, at 1039-42 (cataloging contemporary discon-
tent with the Conformity Act). 
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Uniformity of procedure was among the foremost goals motivat-
ing Congress and the rulemakers to draft the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.250  The Supreme Court explicitly identified preservation of 
that uniformity as the impetus for its decision in Hanna.251  Without the 
uniformity imposed by Hanna, the federal courts of each state would 
assume their own idiosyncratic combination of state and federal pro-
cedural laws.  This would have a pernicious effect on both interstate 
and transsubstantive procedural uniformity.252  In other words, not only 
would attorneys who practice in federal court in different states be 
tasked with learning multiple sets of procedural rules, but attorneys 
who practice in multiple substantive areas within the federal courts of 
one state would also have to juggle different sets of procedural rules.253 
 
250 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 496 (9th ed. 2005) (framing 
the Federal Rules as a response to “an extended period of agitation for uniform pro-
cedural rules”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
429, 432 (6th ed. 2002) (listing “erratic conformity to state procedure” as one of the 
three problems the Federal Rules were intended to address and stating that the uni-
form procedure provided by the Rules in itself “would be a fine accomplishment”); 
Burbank, supra note 68, at 1043-1095 (chronicling the history of the Rules Enabling 
Act, including the activities of the ABA’s Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure 
and early drafts of the Act in the form of the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill). 
251 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965) (“Because of the threat to the 
goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below, we granted certi-
orari.” (citation omitted)). 
252 Cf. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:  Uniformity, Di-
vergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2006 (1989) (identify-
ing four “strands” of procedural uniformity:  “interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate 
uniformity, trans-substantive uniformity, and . . . uniformity of result”).  One could ar-
gue that uniformity in the Federal Rules is a myth (or at least an exaggeration), be-
cause the Rules largely provide discretionary authority to federal judges.  See, e.g., Ste-
phen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) (book 
review) (“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and there-
fore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformi-
ty in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System:  The Case For Presump-
tive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (1997) (arguing that the lack of “limits and 
constraints” in the Federal Rules has led to “disuniformity and experimentation”).  
The validity of these criticisms notwithstanding, even when the Rules provide judicial 
discretion, they play a normative role in defining when discretion exists and how 
broadly the range of discretion extends.  Thus, to the extent that the Rules provide a 
set of answers to a series of equations balancing uniformity and discretion, those equa-
tions are applied uniformly.  Litigants therefore know the presumptive areas and 
ranges within which a federal judge may exercise discretion and the appellate process 
acts as a check on judges who stray beyond the tolerated ranges of discretion. 
253 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 
(2010) (criticizing the dissent’s policy-driven approach because “[i]t would mean, to 
begin with, that one State’s statute could survive pre-emption (and accordingly affect 
the procedures in federal court) while another State’s identical law would not, merely 
because its authors had different aspirations”). 
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Nevertheless, while a major overhaul of Hanna might pose an un-
justifiably large threat to procedural uniformity, the jurisprudence as 
framed by the majority in Shady Grove is not necessarily adequate.  
Threats to federalism might not warrant injecting individual state pol-
icies into the conflict-analysis prong of Hanna, but it does not neces-
sarily follow that a more moderate revision of the doctrine is similarly 
imprudent.  After all, procedure is power.254  And if states attempt to 
use that power to accomplish substantive ends, there is no reason that 
the Erie doctrine should make all of those efforts per se unenforceable 
in federal court merely because the state laws can be characterized as 
conflicting with one of the Federal Rules.255 
Under Hanna, when a state law conflicts with a Federal Rule, there 
are two points of analysis:  the conflict-analysis stage of Hanna and the 
Rules Enabling Act–validity stage of Sibbach.  If a court finds a conflict 
under the expansive post–Shady Grove conflict test, the only hope for 
enforcement of the state law is if the court finds the Rule to be invalid.  
Justice Ginsburg’s preferred method of guarding state interests, ex-
pressed in Gasperini and in the Shady Grove dissent, calls for narrowing 
the scope of what is considered a conflict at the first stage of Hanna, 
thereby channeling more Erie questions into the more state-law-
friendly modified outcome-determination test.  However, this policy 
could unjustifiably disrupt procedural uniformity in federal court. 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Shady Grove offers a more modest 
approach.  Rather than protect federalism by narrowing the range of 
cases decided by the federal-law-friendly Sibbach test, Justice Stevens’s 
proposal keeps the range of cases exposed to the Sibbach test the same, 
but increases the scrutiny of the test.  Specifically, Justice Stevens 
opined that, under the Rules Enabling Act, a federal court cannot ap-
ply a Federal Rule if that application “would displace a state law that is 
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a 
 
254 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
342 (2002) (discussing “procedure as power” in the context of legal training and scho-
larship); Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”:  The Possibilities of Perfect-
ing Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 113 (2007) (acknowledging that “proce-
dure is power”). 
255 See WSU Symposium on State Civil Procedure:  Transcript Highlights of Panelist Discus-
sions, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 295 (2007) (comments of Professor Stephen Burbank) 
(“One of the things that . . . state legislatures have learned is that procedure is power.  
And . . . Congress knows the power of those so-called procedural provisions to effect 
realization or not of the substance of that legislation.  It’s crazy to me—recognizing 
that, at least on matters of substantive law, states will always have different views on 
some subjects—to think that they would or they should give up the power of proce-
dure to effectuate or not their substantive goals.”). 
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state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-
created right.”256  As examples of state laws that are so intertwined, Jus-
tice Stevens listed the New York law concerning review of damages that 
 
256 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Early analysis of Shady 
Grove, citing United States v. Marks, claimed that Justice Stevens’s concurrence con-
trolled on this question.  See Lyle Denniston, Analysis:  Sorting Out an Erie Sequel,  
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/ 
analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel (“Stevens’ view on this general point becomes con-
trolling through the practice of the Court . . . .”).  This is incorrect.  Marks held that 
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the re-
sult enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.’”  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).  As several courts have recognized, “the Marks rule 
is applicable only where one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as narrower than 
another and can represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.”  United 
States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anker 
Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted); accord United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 
189 (2d Cir. 2003); A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Massanari, 305 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Anker Energy Corp., 177 F.3d at 170; King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   
 The opinions in Shady Grove do not indicate that the other Justices share Justice 
Stevens’s views on this question.  The plurality believed that courts should continue to 
evaluate the validity of the Federal Rules under Sibbach, querying whether a Rule “real-
ly regulates procedure.”  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (Scalia, J., for himself, Ro-
berts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed 
repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regu-
lates procedure.”).  Three of the four Justices in the plurality so strenuously disagreed 
with Justice Stevens’s approach that they felt compelled to devote a subsection of their 
opinion to criticizing his opinion.  Id. at 1444-47 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., 
and Thomas, J.).  Nor can the votes to enact Justice Stevens’s concurrence come from 
the dissent.  Although one might conjecture that, owing to their apparently greater 
concerns about the federalism implications of Hanna, the dissenting Justices might 
prefer Justice Stevens’s approach to that of the plurality, the dissent did not address 
the issue of how Rules should be evaluated under the Rules Enabling Act.  See id. at 
1460-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  This is presumably because the dissent would have 
resolved the issue by finding no conflict between New York’s statute and Rule 23, the-
reby channeling the question into the modified outcome-determination test.  There-
fore, it seems that the Shady Grove Court created no new binding precedent on this 
question and Sibbach remains the proper test for determining the validity of a Federal 
Rule.  See also King, 950 F.2d at 782 (“If applied in situations where the various opi-
nions supporting the judgment are mutually exclusive, Marks will turn a single opinion 
that lacks majority support into national law.”); Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Note, Powel-
ling for Precedent:  “Binding” Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 696 (2009) 
(observing that the Marks rule cannot be applied “where the concurring opinion can-
not reasonably be described as narrower than its accompanying majority or plurality 
opinion,” and suggesting instead that legal principles should only become binding 
precedent if there is a majority that supports both the outcome of the case and the ra-
tionale supporting it). 
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was at issue in Gasperini, statutes of limitations, and burdens of proof.257  
One drawback of Justice Stevens’s approach is that it appears to allow 
as-applied challenges resulting in the subordination of individual Fed-
eral Rules in individual cases, thereby undermining uniformity in appli-
cation of the Rules.  Nevertheless, more intense scrutiny of the Rules’ 
validity appears to be one sensible way to reform the overall Hanna 
framework to provide greater protection to federalism.258 
It is also important to observe that Justice Stevens’s proposal 
would not rescue certificate of merit statutes in federal court.  An in-
evitable side effect of any framework governing the compromise be-
tween procedural uniformity and substantive conformity is that the 
closer a given question is to the appointed line of demarcation, the 
more harmful the resolution will seem to the interest it adversely af-
fects.  In other words, when a state rule is so substantive that it almost, 
but ultimately does not, merit enforcement in federal court, federal-
ism will seem particularly aggrieved.  Thus the final question to con-
sider is as follows:  assuming that some modest reform of Hanna is jus-
tified to protect federalism, is it acceptable if that reform does not 
sweep so broadly as to compel the enforcement of certificate of merit 
statutes in federal court? 
The answer to this question is “yes.”  Viewing substantively moti-
vated procedural reforms along a spectrum, it is possible to place 
them in three broad categories.  At one end lie the statutes about 
which Justice Stevens was most concerned—namely, those that appear 
procedural but are “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that 
[they] function[] to define the scope of the state-created right.”259  In 
the middle lie statutes that regulate procedure in order to tip the play-
ing field so that a certain substantive result is more or less likely at the 
end of a fully adjudicated proceeding.260  At the far end of the spec-
 
257 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting that 
these three types of laws “are the sorts of rules that one might describe as ‘procedural,’ 
but they nonetheless define substantive rights”). 
258 This approach, of course, enhances the misperception that federalism pro-
vided the primary impetus behind the limitations in the Rules Enabling Act.  See Bur-
bank, supra note 68, at 1108-13 (demonstrating that separation of powers, not federal-
ism, was the primary motivation behind the limitations in the Rules Enabling Act).  
Nevertheless, at this point, the misconception is inextricably tied to the doctrine.  
Therefore, to the extent that the courts need to be more protective of federalism, the 
limitations in the Rules Enabling Act present an established framework for doing so in 
the field of procedure.  
259 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
260 These statutes often involve admissibility of evidence or forum shopping.  See, 
e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-3-7 (LexisNexis 2005) (limiting venues in which parties can pursue 
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trum lie statutes that seek to regulate litigant behavior, but do not 
seek to influence ultimate adjudications (aside from any effect the sta-
tutes have on pressure to settle).261 
Federal subordination of certificate of merit statutes—laws that 
fall into this third category—simply does not represent that great of a 
threat to federalism.  Aside from slightly reducing the pressure to set-
tle certain suits, certificate of merit statutes have an almost negligible 
effect on the outcome of individual adjudications.262  Instead, their 
greater purpose is in the aggregate.  By reducing frivolous malpractice 
litigation, states hope the statutes will lead to lower malpractice pre-
miums and, ultimately, cheaper health care and greater patient 
access.263  Because the statute’s intent lies not in determining the 
scope of the rights or remedies of individual litigants, but rather in its 
aggregate effect on litigation, allowing a small proportion264 of cases to 
 
class actions and cases against corporations); CAL GOV’T CODE § 11440.45 (West 2005) 
(barring admission of defendant’s sympathy as evidence of liability); see also TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(e) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring a unanimous jury 
verdict to award punitive damages). 
261 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-214 (2005) (placing a twenty-five million dol-
lar cap on appeal bonds); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 52 (2003) (disallowing inclu-
sion of the specific amount of damages sought in a complaint). 
262 See supra text accompanying notes 233-36 (discussing the low probability that the 
claim of a plaintiff who is unable to obtain an expert affidavit would survive summary 
judgment).  This, of course, is not to say that the statutes have no effect at all.  For a nega-
tive appraisal of the effect of certificate of merit statutes, see Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 
861, 869-70 (Okla. 2006).  For a more positive treatment, see Press Release, Office of 
Rep. Bart Gordon, Gordon’s Medical Malpractice Reform Embraced by Administration 
(Sept. 10, 2009), and Press Release, Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court Announces Favorable Trends From Preliminary Data (Mar. 18, 2004). 
263 See, e.g., Zeier, 152 P.3d at 869 (“The Oklahoma Legislature implemented the 
[certificate of merit statute] for the purpose of implementing reasonable, comprehen-
sive reforms designed to improve the availability of health care services while lowering 
the cost of medical liability insurance and ensuring that persons with meritorious in-
jury claims receive fair and adequate compensation.”); Press Release, Office of Rep. 
Bart Gordon, supra note 262 (stating that the primary goals of certificate of merit sta-
tutes are “to reduce frivolous malpractice lawsuits and encourage doctors to abandon 
the practice of defensive medicine”).  This Comment takes no position on the efficacy 
of these statutes, litigation’s influence on the cost of health care, or the merits of tort 
reform in general. 
264 For instance, in 2008, plaintiffs filed 1602 medical malpractice suits in Pennsyl-
vania.  See Press Release, Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Latest Medical Malpractice Data 
Shows Stable Decline in Number of New Cases and Verdicts tbl.1 (Apr. 9, 2009) (indi-
cating that this figure constituted a forty-one percent decline from the 2000–2002 pe-
riod).  Over the same period, only forty-seven medical malpractice cases were filed in 
the federal district courts located in Pennsylvania.  See Personal Injury—Medical Mal-
practice Cases Filed in Pennsylvania Between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008, 
http://dockets.justia.com/search?state=pennsylvania&nos=362&after=2008-01-01& 
before=2008-12-31 (last visted Sept. 15, 2010) (listing results of an online docket search). 
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proceed in federal court without the certificate requirement will 
present minimal disruption to the state’s scheme.  One potential con-
cern is that plaintiffs might attempt to attach federal causes of action 
to their malpractice claims in order to avoid their state’s certificate 
requirement.265  When Hanna requires the subordination of a substan-
tively motivated state law in federal court, federal judges should be 
particularly wary of any lawsuits in which the plaintiff has attached a 
questionable federal claim or claims to a state cause of action.  Under 
such circumstances, judges should exercise with alacrity their discre-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to remand the purely state claims to 
state court, especially if the federal claims are easily dismissed.266  The 
courts can thus attempt to minimize the effect of forum shopping. 
CONCLUSION 
As the nation grapples with the costs of health care, doctors, liabil-
ity insurers, and hospitals will continue to advocate state tort reform as 
a method of controlling expenses.  Certificate of merit statutes won-
derfully illustrate the competing interests at play when federal courts 
consider the enforcement of state litigation reforms.  In principle, the 
Hanna framework establishes a compromise between procedural un-
iformity and substantive conformity, but the hill is steep for substan-
tively motivated state procedural laws.  Applying Hanna faithfully, fed-
eral courts should not enforce certificate of merit statutes while exer-
exercising diversity jurisdiction.  Most of the statutes conflict with at 
least one Federal Rule, and those that do not are generally not out-
 
265 See, e.g., Farrell v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for Children of the Nemours Found., No. 
04-3877, 2006 WL 1284947, at *8 n.6 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2006) (allowing nondiverse 
plaintiffs to maintain state malpractice claims in federal court even after dismissal of 
their federal Rehabilitation Act claims). 
266 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (setting forth criteria under which federal courts 
may exercise their discretion to dismiss pendent state claims); Green v. Young, No. 03-
0722, 2004 WL 5327170, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 8, 2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s Rehabili-
tation Act claims for failure to state a claim and dismissing remaining state claims pur-
suant to § 1367(c)); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
(1966) (establishing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity as the guide-
posts for discretionary exercises of supplemental jurisdiction).  See generally 13D 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 (3d ed. 
2008) (providing an overview of § 1367(c)).  Such an approach is consistent with other 
federal precedent that attempts to prevent litigants from forum shopping to take un-
fair advantage of the Erie doctrine.  See, e.g., Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (declining to predict the expansion of a state law remedy at the request of a 
plaintiff who elected to file in federal court). 
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come determinative.  However, at least until Shady Grove, a majority of 
federal courts enforced the statutes anyway. 
The same tension that has led federal courts to misapply Hanna is 
also visible in the conflicting approaches of Justices Ginsburg and Sca-
lia in Gasperini and Shady Grove.  Consideration of that tension reveals 
that too great a concern for state policies can have a disastrous effect 
on procedural uniformity.  But an overly moderate reform of Hanna 
might not change the doctrine enough to allow enforcement of certif-
icate of merit statutes in federal court.  Ultimately, though, this 
emerges as the most sensible solution.  State causes of action make up 
a large percentage of claims litigants bring in federal court, yet only a 
small percentage of claims under any given state cause of action are 
brought in federal court.  Conformity’s threat to procedure is greater 
than uniformity’s threat to substance.  In the case of certificate of me-
rit statutes, the claimed benefit is in the aggregate:  reduced malprac-
tice premiums, cheaper health care, and greater patient access.  Be-
cause subordination of the statutes in a small percentage of the cases 
should not greatly disrupt the statute’s aggregate goals, nonenforce-
ment seems a small price to pay to maintain the procedural uniformi-
ty of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
